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GROUP RIGHTS, AMERICAN JEWS, AND THE
FAILURE OF GROUP LIBEL LAWS, 1913-1952"
Evan P. Schultz
INTRODUCTION
At the close of World War II, one writer, having spent a
lifetime fleeing the ravages of persecution in Europe, comment-
ed bitterly that even in America,
[Iun the eyes of the law the Jews do not exist as a group. They may
be murdered as a group, but they may not complain about it as a
group. They can be defamed as a sinister gathering of the Elders of
Zion, or as ritual murderers, but there is no effective remedy against
their defamation as a group.1
The writer was technically wrong. Various laws condemn-
ing and punishing defamation of groups did in fact exist on the
books of several states and municipalities as early as the
1910s, and such laws experienced a return to favor in the
years surrounding World War II. But the small number of
claims brought under such laws, and the generally harsh treat-
ment they received in the courts, lend the statement a ring of
truth.2 For some time, disrepute led to obscurity, prompting
one commentator to write over thirty years ago, "It is probable
©2000 Evan P. Schultz. All Rights Reserved.
B.A., Columbia College. J.D., MA, University of Virginia. For all their help,
I would like to thank Charles McCurdy, Michael KIarman, G. Edward White,
Mary Anne Case, Robert O'Neil, and Brendan Cummins. I also thank the
American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the United
States Library of Congress for generously affording me access to the materials in
their archives.
' LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION: SELECTED ESSAYS OF ALEXANDER H. PEKELIS 188
(Milton R. Konvitz ed., 1950).
2 See, e.g., David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel,
42 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 732 & n.26, 750, 778 (1942) [hereinafter Riesman, Group
Libel]; Joseph Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 276 (1950). Specific
instances will be considered in more detail throughout this Article.
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that among today's law students, few have been called upon to
think about group libel and that a fair number have never
heard the term."'
Recently, of course, the subject has attracted renewed
attention.4 Given this resurgent interest in hate speech and its
regulation, it is important to remember that America has trav-
eled this road before, and it seems likely that the current de-
bate regarding hate speech and its regulation will benefit from
a fuller understanding of America's earlier attempts at con-
fronting the issue. Yet the existing works that address these
earlier laws are limited in scope: they tend only to document
specific situations which led to the enactment of group libel
statues,5 to discuss the legal reasoning used in cases ruling on
the legitimacy of various group libel statutes,6 or to consider
the value of free speech to society generally.' As such, these
3 HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7-8 (1965). In
this article, "group libel" and "hate speech" are used interchangeably. For the legal
definition of group libel, see infra Part III.
' This recent renewal of interest in hate speech is shown perhaps most vividly
by the controversy sparked when American Nazis marched in Skokie, Illinois in
the 1970s, and, more recently, by the spate of universities that have passed rules
prohibiting hate speech. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF
A CONTROVERSY 101-59 (1994) [hereinafter WALKER, HATE SPEECH]. See generally
Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment,
60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629 (1985). Another example illustrating the increased
importance of the issue was RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377
(1992), where the Supreme Court struck down on constitutional grounds a city
ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated disorderly conduct.
Also, there has been a resurgence of academic writing on the topic of hate
speech. See generally, HENRY LOUIS GATES JR. ET AL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAK-
ING OF SEX (1994); Mar J. Matsuda, Public Responses to Racist Speech: Consider-
ing the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
See generally WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4.
6 See KALVEN, supra note 3, at 26-48 (analyzing the reasoning used in the
majority and dissenting decisions of Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952));
WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 61-100 (analyzing various First Amend-
ment decisions); Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 734-75 (surveying the
history and contemporary forms of group libel claims); Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at
261 (summarizing history and contemporary forms of group libel claims). See gen-
erally, Note, Liability for Defamation of a Group, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1322 (1934)
[hereinafter Liability for Defamation]; Note, Statutory Prohibition of Group Defa-
mation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 595 (1947) [hereinafter Statutory Prohibition]; Note,
Group Libel Laws: Abortive Efforts to Combat Hate Propaganda, 61 YALE L.J. 252
(1952) [hereinafter Abortive Efforts].
7 See, e.g., WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 167 ("It is in the protec-
tion of all ideas that the history of the hate speech issue demonstrates the true
meaning of the First Amendment."); Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 262 ("Legislation
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articles offer relatively traditional legal analyses; that is, they
concentrate on the specific laws that were enacted and on the
laws' constitutionality. These approaches offer valuable in-
sights, which are discussed throughout this Article. However,
these traditional legal approaches can tell only part of the
story of this country's early group libel laws. A full under-
standing of these laws requires an appreciation of the internal
dynamics of the groups that were the most frequent targets of
the offensive speech. Specifically, to understand the fate of
these early laws, it is necessary to recognize the changing
views that the target groups held towards group rights in
America.'
This Article attempts such an approach. This Article ex-
amines the history of group libel statutes in terms of the evolv-
ing conception of group rights in America as experienced by
American Jews. This focus is particularly appropriate because
Jews often found themselves the targets of written and verbal
assaults in America during the 1900s. Not surprisingly, then,
American Jewish defense organizations initially played a lead-
ing role advocating the enactment and enforcement of group
libel statutes. However, it is vital to note that American Jew-
ish defense organizations later abandoned their support for
these statutes.9 This change was no doubt due to several fac-
tors. One that cannot be discounted, and that is treated in
detail throughout this Article, is the emergence last century of
new conceptions of the First Amendment favoring greater
protection of speech. Nonetheless, this Article's purpose is to
of [group libel] is by definition a restriction on the freedom of discussion. To cur-
tail criticism, however virulent and ill-tempered, is a step so serious as to be
taken only if investigation discloses that substantially more good than evil would
result by so proceeding.").
' Some works, old and new, have noted connections between group rights and
group libel. See, e.g., WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 35-36; Riesman,
Group Libel, supra note 2, at 730-34; Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group
Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1988); Leo Pheffer, Defenses Against Group
Libel, JEWISH FRONTIER Feb., 1946, at 6, 7.
9 WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 14, makes the sensible claim that
'[rlegardless of the merits of a particular idea, it has little practical effect without
a person or organization to persuade others to support it, to bring and argue
cases before courts of law, to propose legislation, and eventually to transform the
idea into public policy." Thus, this Article might be seen as aiming to explain why
American Jewish defense organizations decided to stop supporting group libel stat-
utes.
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propose that American Jews stopped supporting group libel
statutes for the separate reason that they, in large part,
stopped seeing themselves as a group requiring official recogni-
tion or protection in American society. As American Jews gen-
erally assimilated into American society, they valued individu-
al rights more, and group rights less. Based on an examination
of the historical relationship between American Jews and
group libel statutes, this Article proposes that support for
group libel laws is a manifestation of support for group rights.
Thus, by the time the Supreme Court approved of group libel
laws in Beauharnais v. Illinois,"° American Jews had aban-
doned their commitment to a society based in group rights, and
they no longer supported group libel laws.
At the outset, it is important to note the link between
group libel statutes and group rights, since the connection is
not a logically necessary one. One might argue that group libel
statutes actually protect individual rights, since they make
illegal any statements which defame a person by virtue of his
or her membership in a group, thereby violating the American
creed that every person should be judged as an individual. In-
deed, as is discussed later, some advocates of group libel stat-
utes used just such logic." Yet there are two reasons that
nevertheless support a link between group libel statutes and
group rights, which are explored in detail in the body of this
Article. First, there is a correlation. American Jews supported
group libel statutes at the same time that they most strongly
identified themselves as a cohesive, even separate, group with-
in American society. Conversely, American Jews generally re-
fused to support group libel statutes after they began to see
themselves in more individualistic terms. This is not to say
that American Jews ever fully supported one conception over
the other. Indeed, as this Article shows, the historical record
indicates that there was a constant give-and-take between the
prevalence of one idea and the other-assimilation versus
group rights-within the community. The important point is
that support for group libel statutes seemed strongest at the
same time that support for the group rights conception was
strongest.
0 343 U.S. 250 (1952); see infra Part VII (discussing Beauharnais v. Illinois).
" See infra Part III.
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Second, there is the reasoning used by advocates of group
libel statutes to support their cause. They claimed that group
defamation unfairly stigmatized the ethnic group itself and
that the government had a responsibility to step in to protect
the group, rather than the individuals who constituted the
group. Indeed, it is striking to note how several advocates of
group libel laws explicitly justified their theories and actions in
terms of group rights.
Finally, this Article's scope makes it necessary to consider
the constitutional, statutory, and common law history of group
libel laws, the history of Jews in America, and some broader
themes in American history. All of these considerations are
marshaled in order to illustrate the link between support for
group rights and support for group libel statutes. This link, I
propose, is of fundamental importance in understanding some
undercurrents in the debates surrounding the regulation of
hate speech, whether they are the debates that revolved
around the older group libel laws, which are the focus of this
Article, or the contemporary debates. Regardless, the historical
sources examined in this Article may seem somewhat nontradi-
tional for the purposes of analyzing an issue that is normally
thought of in more traditional legal terms. Yet the use of this
broad range of historical resources is precisely what helps to
shed a new light on the subject of group libel and hate
speech. 2
Part I of this Article offers a definition of group libel, and
it also surveys the legal regime governing the topic at the be-
ginning of the 1900s, when American Jews first began to ad-
dress the issue. Part II describes American Jewry as it existed
in the opening decades of the 1900s, when a huge influx of
Jewish immigrants came to America. Moreover, Part II focuses
on the debates concerning how the new arrivals should
acculturate to life in America-either as assimilated individu-
als who would undertake purely voluntary group associations,
or as members of officially recognized and protected ethnic and
religious groups. Part III describes what is apparently the first
' Thus, this Article may be seen as an attempt to "situat[e] constitutional
disputes within their complex historical contexts" by making use of the "social,
political, and ideological accounts of... civil rights and civil liberties" that Profes-
sor Michael Klarman called for in Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 7, 31 (1996).
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step that American Jews took towards advocating a type of
group libel law, combating discriminatory advertisements for
hotels. Part IV describes the articles printed in Henry Ford's
Dearborn Independent throughout the 1920s, probably the
single biggest episode of group libel in American Jewish histo-
ry. Part IV also notes how budding concerns regarding freedom
of expression influenced the manner in which American Jews
responded to the episode. Part V discusses how the success
that Jews achieved in America led them to resolve the accul-
turation debate by pursuing an essentially individualistic con-
ception of American life. Part VI shows that by the time World
War II and increased anti-Semitism came to America, Ameri-
can Jews generally responded by further stressing their indi-
viduality and respect for civil liberties and freedom of expres-
sion. Those who did advocate group libel laws during the
World War II years depended on advocating group rights. 3 To
advocate vigorous group libel laws, American Jews would have
had to abandon their support for individualism and First
Amendment rights. Most refused, instead taking the position
that American Jews needed no special legal protection. This is
shown most vividly in an analysis of a symposium amongst
major Jewish defense organizations called to discuss the wis-
dom of group libel laws. 4 Part VII discusses the significance
of Beauharnais v. Illinois,5 the 1952 Supreme Court decision
that upheld a group libel statute. What is most striking about
this case is that Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion refers
to a group rights justification. Ironically, the Supreme Court
handed down this holding, along with its vindication of a group
rights-based jurisprudence, only after America and American
Jews in particular had embraced the opposing individualistic
conception of American society. This conception of America,
with its increased deference to individual rights generally and
First Amendment concerns specifically, could not countenance
group libel laws.
" See generally Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2. See also infra Part I
(discussing Riesman, Group Libel).
" See infra notes 333-355 and accompanying text (discussing Symposium).
343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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I. EARLY LEGAL LANDSCAPE
For the purposes of this Article, group libel can be defined
as any enactment or law "whereby the publishers and
disseminators of statements that tend to disparage racial and
religious groups are rendered legally responsible for their ac-
tions."" However, within this fairly common-sensical defini-
tion lie multiple causes of action, leading one commentator to
call group libel a "rag-bag phrase."'7 Therefore, this Part
briefly sketches the legal regime of group libel as it existed up
until the beginning of the 1900s, when American Jews first
started to engage the issue. It describes the development of the
non-statutory causes of action used in America to prosecute or
sue those who defamed groups of individuals: criminal libel
and civil libel.18
The American law of libel 9 derives from the English com-
mon law,20 and specifically, from the prohibition on seditious
libel.2' Just as the law of seditious libel developed to suppress
criticism that might endanger the government, the law of crim-
inal libel developed to suppress discord that might endanger
the government, since libel could lead to social unrest.22 The
expansion of criminal libel law to encompass group libel comes
from King v. Osbourne,' an English case decided in 1732.
That case involved a riot prompted by a published paper
16 Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 262.
17 Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 262.
Statutes prohibiting group libel constitute a third device available to combat
the defamation of groups. See infra Part III (considering such statutes).
" Libel refers to written defamations. Slander, or verbal defamation, has al-
ways enjoyed broader protection than libel.
" See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 268-69, 270; Riesman, Group Libel, supra
note 2, at 730. While this Part makes use of Riesman's factual research, Part VI,
infra, contains an in depth discussion of his normative arguments.
21 See KALVEN, supra note 3, at 15-19; Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at
734-36, 742. Seditious libel has its modem origins in the Star Chamber of Tudor
England. Unhindered by procedural niceties or protests that the criticism was true,
the chamber efficiently dispatched with those who criticized the government. One
of its credos was, "Let all men take heede how they complayne in wordes against
any magistrate, for they are gods." Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 735 &
n.35. The criminal jurisdiction of the Star Chamber was merged into the common
law courts during the seventeenth century. See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note
2, at 735.
See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 742.
2 2 Barn. KB. 166 (1732).
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claiming that Portuguese Jews living in London had burned
and killed a woman and her baby.' Although it is unclear
whether the English courts viewed the case as involving
breach of the peace or group libel, the case came to America as
a precedent for group libel." The first American criminal
prosecution for group libel came in the wake of the Civil War,
against a publisher who had accused the Union army of cow-
ardice.26 Despite the large size of the aggrieved group, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court sustained the judgement."
In spite of these precedents, the law of criminal libel had
intrinsic limits as a means to counteract the defamation of
groups, and even of individuals. Because of its origins in the
law of seditious libel, American courts analogized criminal libel
to breach of the peace.28 For instance, in the Civil War case
referred to above, the court stated, "'Indictments for libel are
sustained principally because the publication of a libel tends to
a breach of the peace. .. ."' Moreover, even with this limita-
tion, American courts nevertheless prosecuted a narrow range
of behavior, especially when compared to civil law countries in
Europe that acted under similar constraints.0 This limited
vision of criminal libel in America, which crystallized in the
1800s, can be traced to several factors: popular reaction
against abuses of pre-Revolutionary War libel laws,3 reaction
against the Sedition Act of 1798,32 a firm sense of national
security,33 an apparent absence of class conflict, ' and, most
importantly for the purposes of this Article, the strengthening
2 See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 268-69; Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2,
at 742.
See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 269.
26 See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 270 (describing Palmer v. City of Concord,
48 N.H. 211 (1868)).
See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 270.
, See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 273; Abortive Efforts, supra note 6, at 253
n.6.
29 Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 270 (quoting Palmer, 48 N.H. at 215).
See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 743.
, See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 746.
22 See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 746.
See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 746.
2, See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 746.
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of the American tradition of individualism.35 These factors
made prosecutions for criminal libel, of either individuals or
groups, extremely rare."
The second means employed to counter the defamation of
groups was the law of civil libel. Two forms of civil actions
existed; a suit could be brought by a member of the defamed
group, or a suit could be brought in the name of the defamed
group itself.
3 7
Precedent for an individual member of a group bringing
suit dates back to an English case in the 1600s in which the
defendant referred to a group of seventeen men as murder-
ers.3" Over time, rules developed limiting the instances in
which a member of a defamed group could bring suit. Members
of large groups could not bring suit unless they showed that
the defamation applied to them specifically and in their indi-
vidual capacities. Members of small groups could sue only if
the libel actually applied to each member individually or if the
group was so small that the language must necessarily apply
to each group member.39 In America, by the end of the first
decade of the 1900s, courts had ruled that individuals could
not sue defamers of "wine-joint" owners,4" correspondence
schools4' or trading stamp concerns,42 since those groups
were too large.43 However, individuals could sue for defama-
tion against a family," a partnership,45 a staff of young doc-
tors at a hospital,46 the occupants of a house,4' and a jury.4"
See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 730.
See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 266 & n.43; Riesman, Group Libel, supra
note 2, at 747-50; Abortive Efforts, supra note 6, at 254 n.7.
17 See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 263, 265.
See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 263 (citing Foxcraft v. Lacy, Hbbart 89a, 80
Eng. Rep. 239 (1613)).
9 See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 262.
See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 263 (citing Comes v. Cruce, 107 S.W. 185
(Ark. 1908).
41 See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 263-64 (citing Int'l Textbook Co. v. Leader
Publ'g Co., 189 F. 86 (6th Cir. 1910).
2 See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 263-64 (citing Watson v. Detroit Journal
Co., 107 N.W. 81 (Mich. 1906).
" See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 263-64.
14 See Constitution Pubrg Co. v. Leathers, 172 S.E. 923 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934);
Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 760; Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 264
(both citing Fenstermakers v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 45 P. 1097 (Utah 1896)).
" See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 260 (citing Tobin v. Alfred M. Best Co., 120
A.D. 387, 105 N.Y.S. 294 (1st Dep't 1907)).
'" See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 760; Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at
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Suits brought in the name of the defamed group itself
were also allowed. The typical example would be a corporation
or a partnership that sued a defendant for libel.49 However,
those two forms of groups, officially recognized by the laws of
the states where they were incorporated or resided, essentially
exhausted the types of associations that could sue in their own
names." More informal groups had no standing."1
Thus, like the law of criminal libel, the law of civil libel
had severe limits. First was the bar on members of large de-
famed groups suing as individuals. Second was the strict limit
on the types of groups that could sue in their own names. For
example, ethnic and religious groups had no standing to sue.52
At the root of both of these limitations was the policy underly-
ing the law of civil libel: defamers could be sued only for caus-
ing pecuniary harm to individuals.53 This policy provided a
ready remedy for corporations, which not only existed solely for
commercial purposes, but, in the eyes of the law, stood as fic-
tional individuals. However, groups that existed for purposes
besides making money had no such remedy against libelers,
though they might nonetheless suffer non-pecuniary harm to
their honor or reputations.'
Therefore, criminal and civil libel laws afforded scant
protection to ethnic groups such as Jews. Criminal libel laws,
rooted in seditious libel, could only apply to defamation that
disrupted the workings of the state. Similarly, civil libel laws
could only apply to large groups that had been officially sanc-
tioned by the government, such as corporations. As Part II
260 (both citing Bornman v. Star Co., 174 N.Y. 212, 66 N.E. 723 (1903)).
'4 See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at 260 (citing McClean v. New York Press Co.,
19 N.Y.S. 262, 64 Hun 639 (N.Y. 1892)).
"8 See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 760; Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at
260 (both citing Byers v. Martin, 2 Colo. 605 (1875); Smallwood v. York, 173 S.W.
380 (Ky. 1915); Welch v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 64 N.W. 562 (Minn. 1890)).
"' See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 756-57; Tanenhaus, supra note 2,
at 265.
50 By the 1930s, New York State expanded the category very slightly, allowing
a president of a trade union to sue on its behalf and allowing the New York Soci-
ety for the Suppression of Vice to similarly sue. See Tanenhaus, supra note 2, at
265-66; Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 757, 763.
5 See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 761-62.
52 See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 730-32, 763, 767.
See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 730, 731, 756.
5 See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 730-32, 756.
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tries to demonstrate, it was a matter of some debate in the
opening years of the 1900s whether American Jews wanted to
have their ethnicity sanctioned and recognized by the govern-
ment in such a way. Of equal importance was whether the
government, and particularly the courts, would want to do so.
II. EARLY SOCIAL LANDSCAPE
Between 1880 and 1920, the Jewish population in America
exploded, increasing in raw numbers from 250,000 to almost
3,400,000, and climbing from .5% of the total American popu-
lation to over 3%. The increase was largely caused by a mas-
sive influx of Jews from Eastern Europe. These newer immi-
grants, who soon became the centerpiece of American Jewry,
tended to concentrate in the urban Northeast, especially in
New York.5 This inundation of Jews, itself part of a larger
pattern that brought tens of millions of new immigrants to
America in those same decades,56 sparked a fundamental re-
appraisal of what it meant to be an American.
One reaction to this onslaught of newcomers was a marked
increase of American nativism and phobia towards foreign-
ers. 7 The ebbs and flows of this phenomenon in the decades
that followed form the backdrop to this entire Article. Such
nativism surged again in the 1890s,"s coinciding with the eco-
nomic depression of the times.59 It targeted mainly Catholics,
and Italians in particular." But it also precipitated a wave of
55 See ARTHUR A. GOREN, THE AMERICAN JEWS 2, 21-36, 43 (1982).
16 See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN ET AL., NATIVES AND STRANGERS: ETHNIC GROUPS
AND THE BUILDING OF AMERICA 122 (1979).
57 See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATERNs OF AMERICAN NATIV-
ISM 1860-1925 52-54 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter HIGHAM, STRANGERS]. Higham notes
that "nativism" is a broad phenomenon. However, for the purposes of this Article
it suffices to define it as "unfavorable opinions of outsiders," which becomes mani-
fested so as to prompt fear "that some influence originating abroad threatened the
very life of the [American] nation from within." Id. at 2, 4. Such sentiments, it is
important to note, were not only the exclusive preserve of extremists but also
embodied "more steadily sustained contentions embedded in the fabric of our social
organization." JOHN HIGHAM, SEND THESE TO ME 107 (1975) [hereinafter HIGHAM,
SEND THESE].
" See John Higham, Integrating America: The Problem of Assimilation in the
Nineteenth Century, 1 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 7, 13-14, 19 (1981) [hereinafter
Higham, Integrating America].
59 See HIGHAM, STRANGERS, supra note 57, at 68-70.
60 See HIGHAM, STRANGERS, supra note 57, at 79-80, 90-91.
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concerted anti-Semitism. The anti-Semitism occasionally mani-
fested itself physically in the form of mobs, but it more com-
monly revealed itself in ideological terms, prompting the ap-
pearance in force of the myth of Jews as avaricious Shy-
locks.6' In the words of one patrician of the era, the Jews
would "completely control the finances and Government of this
country in ten years."62
The emergence of an increasingly unitary and regionally
interdependent America' spurred feelings of nativism again
in the years before World War I, and hit a peak in the years
that followed the war." This nativism manifested itself in two
forms. One manifestation was a call for immigration restriction
and deportation of aliens. Cries for such restrictive measures
dated back to the 1880s. 5 The movement for immigration re-
striction gathered increasing strength as the numbers of immi-
grants swelled, until finally the Immigration Restriction Act of
1921 codified the sentiment into law."
A second manifestation of nativism was a call for assimila-
tion. This movement was fueled by the same nativist concerns
that drove the immigration restriction and deportation move-
ments. As one state official said, "We are going to love every
foreigner who really becomes an American, and all others we
are going to ship back home."6 The movement towards assim-
ilation began during the closing years of the nineteenth centu-
ry,68 and by the time World War I loomed, this "American-
"1 See HIGHAM, STRANGERS, supra note 57, at 92-93. But see Oscar Handlin,
American Views of the Jew at the Opening of the Twentieth Century, 40 PUBLICA-
TIONS OF THE AM. JEWISH HIST. SOc. 323, 325 (1951) (claiming that America ex-
hibited philo-Semitic proclivities in the 1890s, which only turned more sinister
with the new century).
42 HIGHAM, STRANGERS, supra note 57, at 93.
See Higham, Integrating America, supra note 58, at 19-20.
See HIGHAM, STRANGERS, supra note 57, at 183-86, 227-33; HIGHAM, SEND
THESE, supra note 57, at 128.
5 See HIGHAM, STRANGERS, supra note 57, at 98-105.
" See Immigration Act Now Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1921, at A17. An even
more restrictive act subsequently became law in 1924. See E.P. HUrCHINSON, LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 183 (1981).
HIGHAM, STRANGERS, supra note 57, at 221.
' See HIGHAM, STRANGERS, supra note 57, at 236-37.
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ization" campaign had won important adherents. For example,
President Woodrow Wilson in 1915 adressed an audience of
newly-naturalized Americans in Philadelphia:
You cannot dedicate yourself to America unless you become in every
respect and with every purpose of your will thorough Americans.
You cannot become thorough Americans if you think of yourselves in
groups. America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of
himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has
not yet become an American, and the man who goes among you to
trade upon your nationality is no worthy son to live under the Stars
and Stripes.6
The doctrine also found adherents amongst the new Americans
and their defenders. Playwright Israel Zangwill, an English
Jew,70 penned the following words in his famous work, THE
MELTING POT:
America is God's Crucible, the great Melting Pot where all the races
of Europe are melting and reforming! .... The real American has
not yet arrived. He is only in the Crucible, I tell you-he will be the
fusion of all races, perhaps the coming superman ... . Celt and
Latin, Slav, Teuton, Greek and Syrian,-black and yellow-Jew and
Gentile-Yes, East and West, and North and South, the palm and
the pine, the pole and the equator, the crescent and the cross-how
the great Alchemist melts and fuses them with his purging flame!
71
It is important to note the subtle differences between
Wilson's and Zangwilrs approaches to assimilation. Wilson's
view, characteristic of an earlier form of assimilationist theo-
ries, 72 expected the new immigrants to conform to a pre-exist-
ing American culture. On the other hand, Zangwill's passage,
characteristic of a different view of assimilation, 7 hoped that
69 See JULIAS W. MULLER, PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES AND STATE PAPERS 115-116
(vol. X, 1917).
"0 While Zangwill never settled in America, his sentiments were shared by sev-
eral immigrant spokesmen. Anthropologist Franz Boas, who held sympathies for
the immigrants, even published a federally funded study stating that the immi-
grants assimilated their physical characteristics to American norms. See HIGHAM,
STRANGERS, supra note 57, at 124-25. See also Solo Baron, Is America Ready for
Ethnic Minority Rights?, 46 JEWISH SOC. STUD. 189, 194-95 (1984).
71 ISRAEL ZANGWILL, THE MELTING POT 37-38, 198-99 (1909). It is from this
play that the image of America as a "melting pot" developed.
72 See PHILIP GLEASON, SPEAKING OF DIVERSITY: LANGUAGE AND ETHNICITY IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 53 (1982).
73 See id.
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a new American hybrid would appear, sporting the beneficial
attributes of each contributing group. But both approaches
were united in advocating a distinctly American culture. Ad-
herents to these two assimilationist approaches hoped assimi-
lation could be used to address the problem of divided loyal-
ties, which it was assumed America's new citizens harbored.74
The sentiment, though it had new vitality in the 1910s, also
had an established heritage amongst both Americans and
Jews.
As early as the Revolutionary Era, one Frenchman stated,
"Here [in America] individuals of all nations are melted into a
new race of men."75 The idea derived from European Enlight-
enment theories stating that society should be based on indi-
viduals rather than on groups. Also derived from the En-
lightenment was a movement among Jews to stand before the
law with rights equal to those enjoyed by all other individu-
als.76 The trend started with the "Jewish Emancipation,"
which accompanied Napoleon's conquering armies in Eu-
rope.77 The movement gained such a strong following that
some European Jews protested attempts to grant rights to
Jews as a group, arguing that Jews would be more secure if
they were treated as full citizens of their homeland nations,
instead of members of a minority group.78
Assimilation in America, then, had an appeal to both the
old-stock Americans and to the Jewish immigrants themselves.
Significantly, the call for assimilation intensified when Ameri-
ca entered World War I, in which America's avowed enemies
were the homelands from which many of these recent immi-
grants had come.79
In spite of these assimilationist forces, a counter-move-
ment developed that aimed to accommodate ethnic groups
74 See, e.g., HIGHAM, STRANGERS, supra note 57, at 39, 40-41, 89.
" Higham, Integrating America, supra note 58, at 10 (citing IMMIGRATION AND
THE AMERICAN TRADITION 29 (Moses Rischin ed., 1976)). It is important to note
that despite the ardor of those holding assimilationist sentiments, "white Ameri-
cans had no intention of translating a national myth into a literal command" until
the end of the nineteenth century. Id. at 10, 19.
76 See NAOMI COHEN, ENCOUNTER WITH EMANCIPATION: THE GERMAN JEWS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1830-1914 4-5 (1984).
7 See Baron, supra note 70, at 198; COHEN, supra note 76, at 6.
71 See Baron, supra note 70, at 200.
79 See HIGHAM, STRANGERS, supra note 57, at 195-204, 245, 248.
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within the American framework. This movement started before
World War I, with the encouragement of some old-stock Ameri-
cans who hoped to enrich the country with the character and
ideas of the world at large.8" Yet the movement served a far
more important cause than merely adding flavor to American
life-it served to cushion the adjustment to life in America for
the immigrants.
This theory won its own important adherents. For exam-
ple, in 1915, Louis Brandeis sounded a call for American Jews
to support Zionist causes and the creation of a Jewish nation
in Palestine. His reasoning summarized how the immigrants
could identify with their new home while still prizing their
roots:
But Jews collectively should likewise enjoy the same right and op-
portunity to live and develop as do other groups of people .... For
the individual is dependent for his development (and his happiness)
in large part upon development of the groups of which he forms a
part .... Nationality like democracy has been one of the potent
forces making for man's advance during the past 200 years .... Let
no American imagine that Zionism is inconsistent with Patriotism.
Multiple loyalties are objectionable only if they are inconsistent ....
Indeed, loyalty to America demands rather that each American Jew
becomes a Zionist.8'
Brandeis emphasized the benefits that would come by
identifying with groups that he thought embodied American
values of democracy, social justice, and responsibility. How-
ever, he stopped there. His works do not evidence a desire for
anything more than the personal gratification and strength he
hoped would come to those who took his ideas to heart, and
the resulting good that would accrue to America as a whole.
The idea gained some appeal, and, indeed, it was developed
further by others.
go See HIGHAM, STRANGERS, supra note 57, at 251-53; Baron, supra note 70, at
196.
8, Louis BRANDEIS, THE JEWISH PROBLEM, How TO SOLVE IT, reprinted in
BRANDEIS ON ZIONISM: A COLLECTION OF ADDRESSES AND STATEMENTS BY LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS 13, 18, 28-29 (1942). Interestingly, Brandeis made his comments in
1915, the same year that President Wilson in Philadelphia railed against the evils
of hyphenated-Americans. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. Wilson ap-
pointed Brandeis to the Supreme Court the next year.
See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION
92 (1981).
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The most thorough contemporary treatment of the idea
came from Horace Kallen," a German-born Jewish academic
and journalist,' whose ideas came to be known by the term
"cultural pluralism." Like Brandeis, Kallen believed that ethnic
groups should be given more recognition in American society.
He wrote, "Because no individual is merely an individual, the
political autonomy of the individual has presaged and is begin-
ning to realize in these United States the spiritual autonomy
of his group."85
However, his ideas went further. His most extreme propos-
al called for formal recognition of ethnic groups in America:
Its form would be that of a federal republic; its substance a democ-
racy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously
through common institutions in the enterprise of self-realiza-
tion .... The common language of the commonwealth ... would be
English, but each nationality would have for its emotional and invol-
untary life its own peculiar dialect or speech, its own individual and
inevitable esthetic and intellectual forms.'
Such pluralistic ideas, and especially Kallen's proposal for
a federation of ethnicities, had roots in older European concep-
tions of group rights. The concept was most familiar to those
immigrants who hailed from the multi-ethnic societies of the
Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, and it dated back to
older European precedents. The first formal recognition of
national minority rights occurred in 1815, when a treaty con-
cluding the Napoleonic Wars contained a provision that Poles
"should obtain their own national representation and institu-
tions" under Russian, Austrian, and Prussian governments.
The Austrian Empire first considered granting similar recogni-
tion to Jews following the Revolution of 1848, and it continued
debating the issue up through the end of World War I. Similar
ideas enjoyed wide support amongst Jews in pre-Revolutionary
Russia, where Jews lived in communities separated from the
' Horace M. Kallen, Democracy Versus the Melting Pot, 100 THE NATION 10
(1915) [hereinafter Kallen, Democracy]. Indeed, it is significant to note that
Brandeis and Kallen were frequent correspondents. See HOwARD M. SACHAR, A
HISTORY OF THE JEWS IN AMERICA 252, 254, 501 (1992).
See Milton R. Konvitz, In Praise of Hyphenation and Orchestration, in THE
LEGEND OF HORACE M. KALLEN 16-23 (Milton R. Konvitz ed., 1987).
Kallen, Democracy, supra note 83, at 117; Gleason supra note 72, at 51.
" Kallen, Democracy, supra note 83, at 124.
[Vol. 66: 1
20001 GROUP RIGHTS, AMERICAN JEWS, AND GROUP LIBEL LAWS 87
rest of society. Advocates finally gained official sanction for
various ethnic confederations in several European countries
following World War I, though most of the arrangements ulti-
mately failed.
So, in America, theories of how the new immigrants
should adjust could be clearly mapped out on a continuum. On
one side were the assimilationists, who advocated an individu-
alistic American culture, either a pre-existing one or one that
would emerge from the fusion of the new immigrants with
their predecessors. On the other side were the pluralists, who
envisioned a continuing role for ethnic groups within America,
either voluntarily or as part of a community with formal recog-
nition by the government.
But the preferences of the immigrants themselves for one
theory or another is not nearly as clear. On the other hand, as
Kallen wrote, the new Jewish immigrants found it expedient to
shed their distinctive ways. They "exhibit economic eagerness,
the greedy hunger of the unfed. Since external differences are
a handicap in the economic struggle, they 'assimilate,' seeking
thus to facilitate the attainment of economic independence.""
Thus, they had a significant urge to assimilate. But, at the
same time, these people undoubtedly felt most comfortable
amongst their own. They lived in enclaves that were over-
whelmingly Jewish.89 The first generation immigrants formed
communal societies, or landsmanshaftn, based not only on
their religion but also on their specific nations of origin." The
trades they pursued, especially tailoring and sewing piece
goods, were chosen at least partially because they allowed theimmigrants to work with and for other Jews."' Indeed, one of
the most popular causes amongst Jews in the opening decades
of the 1900s was the creation of an American Jewish Congress
that could speak with one voice for the entire group of Ameri
can Jews. 2 Even second generation Jews of the time, general-
See IRVING HowE, WORLD OF OUR FATHERS; THE JOURNEY OF THE EASTERN
EUROPEAN JEWS TO AMERICA AND THE LIFE THEY FOUND THERE 7-15 (1976); Bar-
on, supra note 70, at 197-20.
" Kallen, Democracy, supra note 83, at 114.
" See HOWE, supra note 87, at 67-90; SACHAR, supra note 83, at 140-41.
See GOREN, supra note 55, at 46; HOWE, supra note 87, at 183-90.
', See HOWE, supra note 87, at 77-84; SACHAR, supra note 83, at 145; Goren,
supra note 55, at 46-47.
92 See MARC LEE RAPHAEL, JEWS AND JUDAISM IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOC-
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ly more Americanized than their parents, tended to stay to-
gether when they left the ghettoes. 3
Other data is equally ambiguous in helping to determine
whether Jews wanted to assimilate or to pursue life in Ameri-
ca as part of a group. For instance, the success of the Yiddish
press and Jewish labor unions might evidence insular tenden-
cies amongst Jews. But such Jewish institutions might also be
seen as transformative institutions that helped the immigrants
adjust to, and ultimately assimilate into, American society. 4
Zangwill once proclaimed, "There is nothing more American
than a Yiddish newspaper."95 The meaning of even this simple
statement is unclear: Did Zangwill mean to celebrate the diver-
sity in America symbolized by the Yiddish press, or did he
mean to lament that Jews were allowing issues from American
mainstream culture to co-opt this cornerstone of Jewish ethnic
identity?
Similarly, the significance of the success of American Zion-
ism under the leadership of Brandeis is equally inconclusive
regarding whether Jews in America preferred group or individ-
ualistic life in America. The membership roles swelled from
12,000 in 1914 to 140,000 in 1919.' That increase seems to
show a desire by the Jews to act as a cohesive ethnic group on
some level. But does it follow that the American Zionists advo-
cated a formal reconstruction of America along ethnic lines, as
did Kallen? Or did the success of Zionism indicate that Ameri-
can Jews merely wanted to express their ethnic identity vol-
untarily, as one part of their lives, but they were happy to
assimilate other parts of their personalities and lives?
UMENTARY HISTORY 114-16 (1983).
" See Deborah Dash Moore, Defining American Jewish Ethnicity, 7 PROSPECTS
387, 390-91 (1981).
" See GLEASON, supra note 72, at 54; HOWE, supra note 87, at 518-51, 287-
324; SACHAR, supra note 83, at 200-05. The lengths to which the Yiddish press
went in order to Americanize its readers cannot be underestimated. The JEWISH
DAILY FORWARD, for instance, ran an article under the title, The Fundamentals of
Baseball Explained to Non-Sports. See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 204. One contem-
porary reader criticized the Forward's editor, stating, "He prepares gradually for
that which in 1-is opinion is inevitable-assimilation." HOWE, supra note 87, at 529
n.8.
ISRAEL ZANGWILL, WATCHMAN, WHAT OF THE NIGHT 17 (1923) [hereinafter
ZANGWILL, WATCHMAN].
96 See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 253, 501.
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Jewish-funded philanthropic efforts aimed at the Jewish
immigrants also have indeterminate significance. Such efforts
aimed to provide the immigrants with the skills needed to
survive and succeed in America, to clean them up, and so to
assimilate them. The stated goal of the Educational Alliance,
one of the institutions established by old-stock Jews for the
new immigrants, was to be of an "Americanizing, educational,
social and humanizing character."97 But the programs also
served as community centers of sorts, around which the immi-
grants could cluster and gain strength from each other, giving
the charities something of a group-based characteristic.9
And what of an attempt to institute a formal Jewish com-
munity, the Kehillah, in New York? It was definitely a group
activity. But like Brandeis' Zionism, it was voluntary. More-
over, its formation was sparked by concern in New York that
young Jews tended to be criminals, 9 that is, they had not yet
internalized or assimilated enough of America's values. And,
perhaps most significantly, the Kehillah program ended in
failure.100
So, while there may have been little support for Kallen's
ethnic confederation in its pure form,'' the new Jewish im-
migrants also failed to shed wholly their ethnic group identity
'7 GOREN, supra note 55, at 64.
See HOWE, supra note 87, at 229-235; SACHAR, supra note 83, at 150-58. The
memories of two students at the Educational Alliance are illustrative. One man
recalled:
We were "Americanized" about as gently as horses are broken in. In the
whole process, we sensed a disrespect for the alien traditions in our
homes and came unconsciously to resent and despise those traditions,
good and bad alike, because they seemed insuperable barriers between
ourselves and our adopted land.
HOWE, supra note 87, at 233-34. But another remembered that "[it was [at the
Alliance] that my father and mother went regularly to hear the Rev. Masliansky
preach.., in Yiddish." HOWE, supra note 87, at 234-35.
" In 1908, New York Police Commissioner Theodore Bingham remarked that
"[a]mong the most expert of all the street thieves are the Hebrew boys under six-
teen .... Forty percent of the boys at the House of Refuge and twenty-seven
percent of those arraigned in the Children's Court are of that race." SACHAR, su-
pra note 83, at 170.
100 See SACIIAR, supra note 83, at 194-96. See also generally ARTHUR A. GOREN,
NEW YORK JEWS AND THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY (1970).
101 As one commentator wxote, "The publication of Kallen's article in 1915 at-
tracted the attention of a few intellectuals, but its republication and the introduc-
tion of the term cultural pluralism in 1924 passed almost completely without no-
tice." GLEASON, supra note 72, at 52.
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and ties. If their group associations tended to be voluntary and
unsanctioned by the government,0 2 the immigrants saw
themselves as members of a group nonetheless.
It was in this milieu that the first efforts to confront group
libel were attempted. As Part III shows, the dual forces of
assimilation and group identity, so apparent during the open-
ing decades of the 1900s, are equally apparent in these first
efforts to combat group libel.
III. THE FIRST GROUP LIBEL STATUTES
In 1907, a prominent American Jewish woman was denied
accommodations at the Hotel Marlborough in Atlantic City,
New Jersey.0 3 Such exclusions of Jews from resorts, hotels,
and the like dated back to the 1870s; °4 by 1900, such exclu-
sions were almost absolute. 5 But in this case, the woman
was an associate of Louis Marshall, distinguished New York
attorney and president of the American Jewish Committee (the
"AJC"). In response to this incident, Marshall lobbied to have
New York adopt a stricter anti-discrimination statute. 6 The
original statute passed by the New York State Legislature in
1895 was modeled on the failed Federal Civil Rights Act of
1875. '0' The 1895 New York law gave protection to "all per-
sons" from being discriminated against at "inns, restaurants,
hotels, eating houses, public conveyances, bath houses, barber
shops, theaters, or music halls."'
Marshall's amendments to the pre-existing law, in addition
to other changes, would prohibit hotels from printing adver-
102 See Timothy L. Smith, Religion and Ethnicity in America, 83 AMERICAN
HIST. REV. 1168 (1978) ("That this nation's ethnic groups, viewed structurally,
were made in America by voluntary associations of newcomers has long been evi-
dent.").
- See NATHAN C. BELTH, A PROMISE TO KEEP: A NARRATIVE OF THE AMERICAN
ENCOUNTER WITH ANTI-SEMITISM 23-26; HIGHAM, SEND THESE, supra note 57, at
148-51.
104 See BELTH, supra note 103, at 23-26; HIGIHAM, SEND THESE, supra note 57,
at 148-51.
- See HIGHAM, SEND THESE, supra note 57, at 151.
10 See THE JEW IN THE MODERN WORLD: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 386-87
(Paul R. Mendes-Flohr & Jehuda Reinharz eds., 1980); Jeffrey Gurock, The 1913
New York State Civil Rights Act, 1 AJS REV. 93-94 (1976).
Woollcott v. Shubert, 217 N.Y. 212, 218, 111 N.E. 829, 830 (1916).
100 1895 N.Y. Laws 1042; Gurock, supra note 106, at 95.
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tisements stating that the hotels would refuse accommodations
on the basis of the patron's race, color or creed; in effect,
"Christians only" advertisements would be prohibited.0 9 This
proposal constituted America's first step towards a group libel
statute. The bill was finally enacted on April 11, 1913, when
New York Governor William Sulzer signed it into law.110 The
only reported opposition focused on whether the law would
keep hotels from excluding people infected with tuberculo-
sis.111
In order to understand how this bill embodied the tension
between group and individual rights that existed in the Ameri-
can Jewish community at large, it is first necessary to briefly
describe the two Jewish defense organizations that addressed
group libel in these early years-the AJC and the Anti-Defa-
mation League of the B'nai B'rith (the "ADL"). The histories of
these two groups, as well as the approaches they took to group
libel statutes, illustrate the tension well.
The AJC was the oldest of the Jewish defense organiza-
tions. It was founded by wealthy American Jews of German
100 See Gurock, supra note 106, at 93, 96.
11 See 16 AM. JEWISH Y.B. 398 (1914-1915); Gurock, supra note 106, at 107;
Civil Rights Bill Passes Assembly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1913, at 12; New State
Laws in Effect Today, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1913, at 1; No Discrimination Under
this New Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1913, at 4.
The delay between proposal and enactment of the law seems to have less to
do with a shift in public opinion during those six years so much as with a chang-
ing of the guard in Albany. One theory seems to make sense, that Marshall and
other advocates of the bill had support from down-state politicians who won con-
trol of both houses of the state legislature and of the governor's office only in
1913. See Gurock, supra note 106, at 102-05.
Indeed, Marshall was good friends with the new governor, William Sulzer.
Sulzer had assisted Marshall with earlier projects for the AJC, and Marshall rep-
resented Sulzer at his impeachment trial in 1913. See Gurock, supra note 106, at
105; Lawyers Fight Sulzer Case on Money Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1913, at 1.
... See Bars Insult by Hotels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1913, at 6.
The final version of the statute read in relevant part:
No person . .. shall .. . withhold from or deny to any person any of the
accommodations, advantages or privileges thereof, or directly or indirectly
publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail any written or printed
communication, notice or advertisement, to the effect that any of the
accommodations, advantages and privileges of any such place shall be
refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of race, creed
or color, or that the patronage or custom thereat, of any person belong-
ing to or purporting to be of any particular race, creed or color is unwel-
come, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or solicited.
1913 N.Y. Laws 265 § 40.
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descent in 1906 primarily to combat anti-Semitism abroad,
though it also undertook tasks in America." The AJC main-
ly concerned itself with eliminating social, legal and political
obstacles that still confronted individual Jews."' It is signifi-
cant to note that Marshall, describing his thoughts on the cre-
ation of the AJC, specifically disavowed any intention to estab-
lish a formal Jewish political organization:
What I am trying to avoid more than anything else is, the creation
of a political organization, one which will be looked upon as indica-
tive of a purpose on the part of the Jews to recognize that they have
interests different from those of other American citizens .... We
can, however, all unite for the purpose of aiding all Jews who are
persecuted, or who are suffering from discrimination in any part of
the world on account of their religious beliefs; and we can at the
same time, unite for the purpose of ameliorating the condition of our
brethren in faith, who are suffering from the effects of such persecu-
tion and discrimination directly or indirectly.1
That is, Marshall was primarily concerned with having Jews
treated as individuals, unencumbered by characteristics and
stereotypes which might be attributed to Jews generally. He
was apparently less interested in attaining any special
protections or recognition for Jews as a group. The first action
that the AJC undertook illustrates this point well.
In 1907, the United States State Department issued a
circular stating that it would formally start to honor a Russian
practice, previously acceded to informally, that denied entrance
visas to American Jews."' The Russian actions violated an
1832 trade treaty between the two nations."6 In response to
the State Department circular, the AJC launched a campaign
to have America abrogate the treaty if Russia refused to
change its practice regarding American Jews."1 Ultimately,
112 See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 228-29, 308; Mendes-Flohr & Reinharz, supra
note 106, at 386 n.1.
S See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 308.
114 Letter from Louis Marshall to Rabbi Joseph Stolz (Jan. 12, 1906), in LOUIs
MARSHALL: CHAMPION OF LIBERTY 21-22 (Charles Reznikoff ed., 1957).
115 See COHEN, supra note 76, at 236-38; SACHAR, supra note 83, at 229-33.
.16 See COHEN, supra note 76, at 236-38; SACHAR, supra note 83, at 229-33;
Russia and the American Passport (1911), in Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 60.
1" See COHEN, supra note 76, at 236-38; SACHAR, supra note 83, at 229-33;
Russia and the American Passport, in Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 60.
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Russia refused to concede the point, and America repudiated
the treaty."8 The AJC's rationales for its actions are telling.
According to Marshall, the State Department practice, if
kept in force, might have led Jews to become second-class
citizens within the United States, since it showed bias for the
government to treat American Jews differently from other
Americans."' And, no less important to the AJC, the aboli-
tion of the Russian practice might have lead the Russian gov-
ernment to accord full travel rights to its own Jewish citizens,
who until then had been kept in the Jewish "Pale" of settle-
ment.
2 0
Thus, the AJC saw its primary mission as attaining full
rights for individual Jews, be they American or Russian, and
repudiating any special treatment that might be accorded to
Jews as a group. This approach was similar to that of Wilson
or Zangwill, since it aimed for a society where each citizen
would be an individual, unencumbered by ethnic identity,
prejudices or stereotypes.
The second organization, the ADL, was founded in 1913 to
combat anti-Semitism in America. It initially consisted mainly
of middle-class Jews of German descent.12 ' The ADL began in
the wake of the trial of Leo Frank,122 which had been the
centerpiece of a frenzy of anti-Semitism. In contrast to the
AJC's focus on individualism, the ADL sought to "preserve the
good repute of Jews and Judaism,"" and it thought that the
1"' See COHEN, supra note 76, at 236-38; SACHAR, supra note 83, at 229-33;
Russia and the American Passport, in Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 60.
.. See Letter from Louis Marshall to Rabbi Joseph Stolz, in Reznikoff, supra
note 114.
12) See COHEN, supra note 76, at 236-38; SACHAR, supra note 83, at 229-33;
Russia and the American Passport, in Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 60.
121 See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 307-08.
1 See DEBORAH DASH MOORE, BINAI B mTH AND THE CHALLENGE OF ETHNIC
LEADERSHIP 107-09 (1981); SACHAR, supra note 83, at 307-08. Frank was a Jewish
businessman who was arrested for murdering a girl in Georgia. After being con-
victed by a state court, he was lynched by a mob soon after having his death sen-
tence commuted to life in prison. Interestingly, Louis Marshall represented Frank
at the trial. See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 301-06. For a thorough account of the
Frank trial and its impact on the American Jewish community, see LEONARD
DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE (1968) and Leonard Dinnerstein, Leo M.
Frank and the American Jewish Community, 20 AM. JEWISH ARCHIVES 107 (Nov.
1968).
123 MOORE, supra note 122, at 106 (quoting ADL founder Samuel Livingston);
Report of the Anti-Defamation League (May, 1915), in Mendes-Flohr & Reinharz,
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best way to combat anti-Semitism was "an assertion of Jewish
identity and an acceptance of collective responsibility."" The
ADL's 1915 Statement of Policy used similar language, stating
that the organization's goal was to protect against "the con-
stant and ever increasing efforts to traduce the good name of
the Jew."" That is, the ADL pursued a policy that very
closely resembled the group rights approaches advocated by
Kallen and Brandeis.1
6
The focus of the actions which the AJC and ADL under-
took also differed. While the AJC acted on a wide array of is-
sues, the ADL focused mainly on group defamation. Its very
name indicated as much, and its charter stated, "The immedi-
ate object of the League is to stop, by appeals to reason and
conscience, and if necessary, by appeals to law, the defamation
of the Jewish people."'27
Specifically, the ADL undertook a campaign against nega-
tive stereotypes of Jews in popular culture. It opposed the
misuse of the word "Jew" in newspaper articles,'28 theater
and movie shows where Jews were depicted as sly and avari-
cious, and the use in public schools of classics such as OLIVER
supra note 106, at 403.
124 MOORE, supra note 122, at 106 (quoting ADL founder Samuel Livingston);
Report of the Anti-Defamation League (May, 1915), in Mendes-Flohr & Reinharz,
supra note 106, at 403.
125 MOORE, supra note 122, at 106.
126 The respective actions which the AJC and the ADL took in response to the
Frank trial are telling. While Marshall said that "it would be most unfortunate if
anything were done ... from the standpoint of the Jews," the ADL thought that
concerted Jewish action was the only effective way to combat the anti-Semitism
surrounding the case. MOORE, supra note 122, at 107-08.
" Anti-Defamation League, BNAI B I NEWS (Oct., 1913), in BELTH, supra
note 103, at 42. The charter went on to say, "Its ultimate purpose is to secure
justice and fair treatment to all citizens alike and to put an end forever to unjust
and unfair discrimination against and ridicule of any sect [or] body of citizens."
BELTH, supra note 103, at 42. Thus, the organization arguably aimed to attain
equal treatment for all in the long-term. Even so, the ADL's short-term tactics
and goals tended towards collective action and group rights.
" A memo from New York Times editor Adolph Ochs hinted at the practices
then in vogue:
The word "Jew" is a noun and should never be used as an adjective or
verb. To speak of "Jew girls" or "Jew stores" is both objectionable and
vulgar . . . . The use of the word "Jew" as a verb-to Jew down"-is a
slang survival of the medieval term of opprobrium ... and should be
avoided altogether.
BELTH, supra note 103, at 46.
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TWIST and THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, which contain arguably
derogatory depictions of Jews.'29
However, it is important to note that both the AJC and
the ADL called for legal regulation as one of the methods to be
used in accomplishing their respective tasks. For the AJC, both
the Russian treaty and the New York law involved the use of
government intervention. For the ADL, the charter mentioned
above13 called for legal action as a last resort. Also, two of
the ten stated programs included in the ADL's 1915 Statement
of Policy called for legislation.' Specifically, both organiza-
tions agreed that "Christians only" advertisements should be
banned.'32 Thus, group libel legislation in its earliest mani-
festation garnered support from two organizations that appar-
ently held opposing views about the validity of group rights in
America. With this background, it is possible to examine the
1913 New York law, and similar laws that were modeled after
it, for evidence of how they could be supported by groups with
such different motives.
There are several reasons to think that Marshall intended
the 1913 New York law to protect the rights of Jews to be
treated as individuals unburdened by their group affiliation.
First, as discussed above, is the AJC's wish to avoid having
Jews seen as a group meriting special legal protection.'33 Sec-
ond is a 1907 letter Marshall wrote when lobbying for the
statute. It stated, "[Jews] ask for no special privileges, but they
have a right to demand the same protection which is afforded
12 See, e.g. BELTH, supra note 103, at 43-57; SACHAR, supra note 83, at 308;
B'NAI B'RTH MANUAL 360-72 (Samuel S. Cohen ed., 1926) (hereinafter BNAI B'RTH
MANUAL]; Fourteenth Convention, BNAI B' R PROc. 211-13, 306, 311, 313, 318
(1935); Ellen Schiff, Shylock's Mishpocheh: Anti-Semitism on the American Stage, in
ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY 79-99 (David A- Gerber ed., 1986); The Anti-
Defamation League: A Statement of Policy (1915), reprinted in Mendes-Flohr &
Reinharz, supra note 106, at 403-404.
1"' See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
... See Mendes-Flohr & Reinharz, supra note 106, at 403-04. The other projects
concerned educational campaigns such as providing books, pamphlets, and speakers
on Jewish subjects, dialogue in the press, and private appeals to editors of periodi-
cals and producers of plays and movies to change their characterization of Jews.
See Mendes-Flohr & Reinharz, supra note 106, at 403-04.
13 One of the two legal planks of the ADL's 1915 STATEMENT OF POLICY sup-
ported such laws. See Mendes-Flohr & Reinharz, supra note 106, at 404.
133 See supra notes 114-120 and accompanying text.
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to men of every other race, faith, and creed.""3 That is, they
have the right to be treated as individuals. Third is the impor-
tant fact that the ban on "Christians only" advertisements was
an amendment to a law that already prohibited hotels from
banning Jews from their premises. As such, since the original
law aimed to allow individuals of all creeds to stay at hotels,
the statute, even as amended, evidences a concern for individu-
al rights.
Yet the 1913 legislation might also be seen as protecting
group rights. Under the law, anyone who wrote "Christians
only" in their advertisements, and thus offended the reputation
of American Jews as a group, would be punished by the gov-
ernment. The ADL's position illustrates this point well. When
the ADL supported legislation based on the 1913 New York
law, the organization pointedly omitted the insistence that
hotels actually admit Jewish guests.' The ADL stated,
"While the League had no interest in forcing such establish-
ments to admit Jews, it strenuously opposed the publicity thus
given because of the effect in fostering anti-Semitic feel-
ing." 6 The rationale, as one ADL official explained, was that
"de facto social discrimination could not be fought through law;
but the public advertisement that Jews were outcasts had to
be prevented."'37 These comments indicate that the ADL was
not spurred to action because "Christians only" advertisements
violated any individual rights. Rather, it seems that the ADL
supported legislation modeled on the 1913 New York law be-
cause "Christians only" advertisements portrayed Jews, as a
group, in a negative light. And, if that is the case, the ADL's
actions indicate a tendency towards protecting group rights.
Even the AJC's Marshall made some arguments indicating
a concern with group reputation rather than with individual
13 Gurock, supra note 106, at 118.
'" The ADL's 1915 STATEMENT OF POLICY stated:
[T]he League will endeavor to secure the passage of laws, where the
same is practicable, making it unlawful for any hostelry, directly or indi-
rectly, to publish, circulate, issue, display, post, or mail any written or
printed communication, notice or advertisement, to the effect that any of
the accommodations of such places shall be refused, withheld, or denied
to any person on account of his creed.
Mendes-Flohr & Reinharz, supra note 106, at 404.
13 B'NAI BRIH MANUAL, supra note 129, at 366.
' MOORE, supra note 122, at 109.
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rights of access. In a letter he wrote in 1907 in support of the
bill, Marshall stated, "Even though Jews may be excluded on
one pretext or another from hotels and public places, it must
not be on the specific ground which ranks Jews with
consumptives, mosquitos or in terms otherwise insulting."138
Similarly, in a 1929 letter, Marshall wrote, "This legislation
has at all events prevented the infliction of a public insult."'39
His concern with the "public insult" that "Christians only"
advertisements inflicted onto Jews shows that Marshall did
not see the 1913 law solely as an individual rights issue. It is
also characteristic of a deeper ambiguity in his thought regard-
ing the debate about whether Jews would do best to pursue a
strategy of group or individual rights.
For instance, when lobbying for the 1913 New York bill in
1907, Marshall alluded to the 850,000 Jewish New Yorkers
who would watch the actions of the legislature.'40 Apparently
contradicting himself, in another situation he stated, "The idea
of getting political recognition because one is a Jew is, to me,
unspeakably shameful,"4 and that Jewish citizens have "no
distinctly Jewish interests with respect to matters of govern-
ment." Also, while he once said that "there are no people
on earth who more readily assimilate than the Jews,"' he
also commented that "[i]f [Zangwill's doctrine of the melting
pot] is intended to convey the idea of being totally absorbed
and of losing one's identity completely, then I am frank to say
that I hope the Jews will never be assimilated."' And, in
contrast to his stated opposition to group rights for American
1"8 Letter from Louis Marshall to Martin Saxe (May 22, 1907), in Reznikoff,
supra note 114, at 249.
"" Letter from Louis Marshall to Hugo S. Mack (Mar. 23, 1923), in Reznikoff,
supra note 114, at 253.
0 See Gurock, supra note 106, at 103, 118.
141 HEYWOOD BROUN & GEORGE BRITT, CHRISTIANS ONLY: A STUDY IN PREJU-
DICE 270 (1931).
142 MORTON ROSENSTOCK, LOUIS MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF JEWISH RIGHTS 36-37,
56 (1965).
1 Id. at 35.
14 Id. However, it seems that Marshall interpreted Zangwill to be proposing
intermarriage. Thus, his objections should be taken in that context. See id.
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Jews mentioned above," 5 after World War I Marshall sup-
ported the creation of legally recognized national minority
rights for Jews and other minorities in Europe.14 6
Similarly, Marshall's involvement in another prominent
legal case also shows ambiguities in his thought. In 1924, the
Supreme Court unanimously decided Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters,47 holding that a 1922 Oregon law that outlawed private
education violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause. Specifically, the Court ruled that the Oregon statute
would both deprive the schools of their property without due
process and interfere with parents' substantive due process
rights to raise their children. 48 Marshall submitted an ami-
cus brief on behalf of the AJC opposing the law. Like his views
on the 1913 New York law, Marshall's position on the case
seemed to support assimilation and individualism. The Oregon
statute was unconstitutional, he wrote, because "[t]he right to
choose the medium whereby an education is to be received is
taken away, not only from the parent or guardian of the pupil
or student, but also from the pupil or student himself."'
Furthermore, Marshall viewed the statute as undesirable be-
cause "[t]he assimilation, so-called, of our foreign born citizens
is advanced rather than retarded by the private, parochial and
religious schools."5 °
But Marshall's stance in the case might also indicate sym-
pathy for group rights. The Ku Klux Klan sponsored the
bill, '5 and the bill aimed to implement a policy of strict as-
similation and Americanization. As such, any opposition to the
bill might be seen as opposing full assimilation, and therefore,
intentionally or not, advocating group rights. Also, Marshall's
brief contains references to the ills inherent in compelling
"those of various races and creeds" to abandon their distinctive
cultures.'52 Thus, it was not only in the context of the 1913
145 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
1 See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 269.
147 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
1 See id. at 534-36. For a comprehensive analysis of both the circumstances
surrounding the passage of the law, and of the decision itself, see DAVID TYACK ET
AL., LAw AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 1785-1954 177-92 (1987).
14, Brief for the American Jewish Committee (amicus curiae for appellees) at 5,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924) (No. 209221 and 209222).
0 Id. at 12.
1.. See TYACK, supra note 148, at 177-79.
112 Brief for the American Jewish Committee (amicus curiae for appellees) at 10,
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New York law that Marshall's views seem ambiguous. While
he generally advocated an individualistic vision of American
life, some of his actions and statements seem to support group
rights.
By 1926, seven states, at the urging of both the AJC and
the ADL, had adopted statutes similar to the 1913 New York
Law.153 Significantly, those statutes followed the ADL's ver-
sion of the law, abandoning the prohibition on actual discrimi-
nation in access to hotels and such, and instead banning only
the dissemination of advertisements stating that Jews were
not welcome. Despite the modest popularity of these statutes,
they proved relatively ineffective. Hotels still generally refused
to allow Jews to register as guests.'" And if hotel proprietors
were ever charged with discrimination, they had the advantage
of sympathetic juries.'55 Moreover, the ban on discriminatory
advertising, which was the main focus of the 1913 bill, proved
easy enough to evade. Proprietors simply used codewords or
expressions that technically fell outside the grasp of the stat-
ute, such as noting that churches were nearby, to indicate who
was welcome.'56 So, it was unclear if, as Marshall claimed,
the laws at least "prevented the infliction of a public in-
sult."
157
This, then, was the fruit of the first campaign for group
libel statutes. Such laws could be justified by one of two theo-
ries. They might stand for the proposition that assimilation
should be accelerated in America by prohibiting hotels from
treating Jews as members of a group. Alternately, the laws
might indicate support for the right of Jews as a group to have
the government protect their good name in the public realm. It
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 91O (1924) (No. 583).
... The states were Illinois, Colorado, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylva-
nia, Maine, and Minnesota. See B'NAI B'RITH MANUAL, supra note 129, at 366-67;
Pennsylvania Civil Rights Law, 20 AM. JEWISH Y.B. 381-82 (1918-1919). Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Washington, Wisconsin, Florida, and Virginia passed similar laws
at later dates. See MILTON P. KONvITz & THEODORE LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL
RIGHTS 169 (1961).
'" See, e.g., BROUN & BRITT, supra note 141, at 246-67; Letter from Louis Mar-
shall to Hugo S. Mack (Mar. 23, 1929), in Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 253.
15 See Gurock, supra note 106, at 112.
1 See Gurock, supra note 106, at 111 & n.60.
1 Letter from Louis Marshall to Hugo S. Mack (Mar. 23, 1929), in Reznikoff,
supra note 114, at 253.
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may seem surprising that the law was thus justified by these
two apparently contradictory theories. But such ambiguity was
typical of the views that Jews at the time generally held to-
wards acculturation in America. Indeed, the discussion of
Marshall's views demonstrates that the contradictions in views
could manifest themselves even within a single person. But
aside from the question of the theoretical reasons supporting
these statutes was the more immediate question of whether
they would have the effect of, at least, stopping the "public
insult" that so concerned both the AJC and the ADL. The first
significant group libel trial, discussed in Part IV, demonstrates
that they would not.
IV. THE DEARBORN INDEPENDENT
On May 22, 1920, Henry Ford's newspaper, the Dearborn
Independent, initiated an anti-Semitic tirade that would persist
for seven years.' The series essentially consisted of com-
mentary on a publication, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion
(the "Protocols"), which had recently appeared in Europe and
in America. The Protocols purportedly was the minutes from a
meeting of Jews who were conspiring to entrap the world in a
web of financial and political deception. 9 The AJC and the
ADL learned of the Protocols almost immediately, and in 1920
unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade American publishers
from printing it as a book.6 At first, Marshall thought that
the preposterous nature of the material would lead the public
to ignore it.'6' However, he soon began to take the situation
"' See, e.g., LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICA 80-84 (1994)
[hereinafter DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM]; ALBERT LEE, HENRY FORD AND THE
JEWS 29 (1980); ROSENSTOCK, supra note 142, at 128; Mendes-Flohr & Reinharz,
supra note 106, at 407, 409.
159 See ROSENSTOCK, supra note 142, at 118-19.
'6o See, e.g., THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, FOURTEENTH ANN. REPORT, 21-
32 (1921); Letter from Louis Marshall to A-C. Ratshesky (Sept. 10, 1920), in
Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 333-34.
,' "[The PROTOCOLS] is so exceedingly silly that, were it not for the fact that it
has made an impression on quite a number of people to whom it has been
shown ... one might well treat it with derision." Letter from Louis Marshall to
Cyrus Adler (Dec. 18, 1919), in Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 328.
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more seriously, once calling it "[tihe most serious episode in
the history of American Jewry."'62
The first installment of Ford's International Jew series in
the Dearborn Independent claimed to explain the "instinctive"
anti-Semitism, which Jews have confronted throughout the
ages, as flowing from the fact, now revealed, that Jews had
exploited the realms of commerce and finance to gain an upper
hand.163 In later issues, the paper claimed that specific Jews,
including AJC head Marshall, were plotting to wreck the na-
tion." Explaining his motives for the series, Ford comment-
ed that he was "only trying to awake the Gentile world to an
understanding of what is going on. The Jew is a mere huck-
ster, a trader who doesn't want to produce, but to make some-
thing out of what somebody else produces."'
American Jewry, prompted by the AJC and the ADL, mo-
bilized and undertook a series of actions to combat Ford and
his publication.'66 Marshall wrote to Ford to complain about
the Dearborn Independent on June 3, 1920, days after the
publication of the first installment of Ford's series.'67 He stat-
i See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 315.
I See The International Jew: The World's Problem, DEARBORN INDEPENDENT,
May 22, 1920, at 1-5, in Mendes-Flohr & Reinharz, supra note 106, at 407-09.
1" See ROSENSTOCK, supra note 142, at 131; Edwin Black, The Anti-Ford Boy-
cott, 32 MMSTREAM 39, 39 (1986).
1' DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 158, at 81.
*" Interestingly, the AJC opposed any public response to Ford after the first
article was printed. Members of the AJC Executive Committee thought that Ford's
series was "not getting any wide publicity except in the Jewish press" and that "a
public defense at the present time might be undesirable and only lend further
publicity to an unpleasant situation." American Jewish Committee, Meeting of the
Executive Committee Minutes, June 23, 1920 (on file with the American Jewish
Committee archives). Marshall seemed to agree with this policy, even though he
had written on June 5, 1920 that "[i]t is better that this whole matter be brought
out in the open than to allow this poison to circulate under the surface as it now
does." Letter from Louis Marshall to Julias Rosenwald, June 5, 1920, in Reznikoff,
supra note 114, at 330. By October 1920, the circulation of the Dearborn Indepen-
dent had risen from about 70,000 to 250,000. See American Jewish Committee,
Meeting of the Executive Committee Minutes, June 23, 1920 and Oct. 10, 1920 (on
file with the American Jewish Committee archives). Only then did the AJC decide
to respond publicly. See id. Even so, on October 11, 1920 Marshall wrote, "After
all Ford, however, is a very small element in the problem which confronts us.
Infinitely more harm is being done by the distribution of the so-called Protocols."
Letter from Louis Marshall to Harris Weinstock (Oct. 11, 1920), in Reznikoff, su-
pra note 114, at 337-38.
" Letter from Louis Marshall to Henry Ford (June 2, 1920), in THE AMERICAN
JEWISH COMMITEE, FOURTEENTH ANN. REPORT, supra note 160, at 19-20.
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ed that Ford's comments "constitute a libel upon an entire
people who had hoped that at least in America they might be
spared the insult, the humiliation and the obloquy which these
articles are scattering throughout the land."16
At the same time, the AJC called for a meeting of major
American Jewish organizations so that they could take joint
action to combat "the assault that has been made upon their
honor."'69 As a result of the meeting, a leaflet entitled, "The
Protocols" Bolshevism and the Jews: Address to the American
Public was published on December 1, 1920, which refuted the
charges made in the Dearborn Independent.7 ' Also, the AJC
and other organizations arranged to have 119 prominent
Americans, including President Wilson and ex-President Taft,
sign a petition condemning Ford's publication. 1' In addition,
American Jews began a boycott of all of Ford's products.'72
Finally, the AJC and the ADL tried to enlist three forms of
official government intervention. 7 '
First, the two organizations contemplated a Congressional
investigation of Ford. The AJC first considered the idea when
discussing the Dearborn Independent situation in October
1'8 THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, FOURTEENTH ANN. REPORT, supra note
160, at 19-20. In response, the Dearborn Publishing Company wrote, "Your rheto-
ric is that of a Bolshevik orator." Letter from the Dearborn Publishing Company
to Louis Marshall, in THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, FOURTEENTH ANN. RE-
PORT, supra note 160, at 20.
169 Letter from the Dearborn Publishing Company to Louis Marshall, in THE
AMERICAN JEWISH COMMMITEE, FOURTEENTH ANN. REPORT, supra note 160, at 32-
33.
170 See BELTH, supra note 103, at 78; "THE PROTOCOLS" BOLSHEVISM AND THE
JEWS: ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC (1921) (on file with the American Jewish
Committee archives); THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, MEETING OF THE EXECU-
TIVE COMMITTEE MINUTES (Nov. 13, 1920) (on file with the American Jewish Com-
mittee archives).
'7' See ROSENSTOCK, supra note 142, at 149-57.
172 See Black, supra note 164, at 40. Initially, Marshall and the AJC opposed
such a boycott, claiming that "any proposed boycott might act as a boomerang and
produce a counter boycott in which the Jews would greatly suffer." THE AMERICAN
JEWISH COMMITTEE, MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MINUTES (June 23,
1920) (on file with the American Jewish Committee archives). Marshall never
officially sanctioned an official boycott. However, he approved of a "silent" boycott,
stating that American Jews would know to follow it "without being told." Id.
173 Marshall also made use of "unofficial" government intervention, such as
asking President Harding to talk to Ford, who was a friend of the President. See
Letter from Louis Marshall to Warren G. Harding (July 25, 1921), in Reznikoff,
supra note 114, at 361.
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1920,' but ultimately rejected an investigation. Marshall
again rejected the idea in March 1921, stating that American
Jews had already done enough on their own to "demonstrate
the underlying falsehood of Ford's campaign."'75 He elaborat-
ed his reasons in another letter, stating that a Congressional
investigation "would enable our enemies to shovel into the
record all kinds of stupid and inane charges."7 '
The second form of government action that was contem-
plated and later abandoned was instituting civil or criminal
libel suits against Ford or the Dearborn Publishing Company.
Marshall was acutely aware of the state of group libel law at
the time.'77 He wrote that "[t]he technical difficulties of such
a proceeding are enormous. The expense would be prohibi-
tive.""'78 Also, the forum of a trial would give further publicity
to Ford's charges, and, in light of the successful actions that
American Jewry and many newspapers had taken to discredit
Ford, Marshall felt that litigation was unnecessary."
It is significant, however, that Marshall did not oppose
such actions in theory. He wrote in April 1921 to the Christian
Science Monitor:
Although the vast majority of the Jews of this country... are op-
posed to all retaliatory measures either looking to the prevention of
the sale of the Dearborn Independent on the streets or otherwise...
or to the exclusion from public libraries, or to legislation, however
justifiable in principle, creating a remedy where none now exist,
nevertheless it is but natural for men persistently insulted, as the
Jews have been by Ford, to resent the insult and to seek immediate
relief.
180
174 See Letter from Louis Marshall to Rabbi Isaac Landsman, (Dec. 24, 1920), in
Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 350 n.*.
"7 Letter from Louis Marshall to Joseph Henkin (Mar. 24, 1921), in Reznikoff,
supra note 114, at 350.
.7 Letter from Louis Marshall to Adolf Kraus (Apr. 26 1921), in Reznikoff,
supra note 114, at 350 n.*.
17 See Part I, supra, for the status of group libel law at the time.
178 Letter from Louis Marshall to Adolf Kraus (Apr. 26, 1921), in Reznikoff,
supra note 114, at 351 n.*.
... See Letter from Louis Marshall to Felix Vorenberg (Apr. 26, 1921), in
Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 357; Letter from Louis Marshall to the Editor,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Apr. 28, 1921), in Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 358-
60.
1 Letter from Louis Marshall to the Editor, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, (Apr.
28, 1921), in Rezikoff, supra note 114, at 358-60. In a similar vein, Marshall
wrote to another correspondent:
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Therefore, it is not surprising that Marshall decided to
lobby for group libel legislation, the third form of government
intervention that the AJC and the ADL pursued. In a letter he
wrote to Governor Nathan Miller of New York in February
1921, Marshall stated that such statutes were necessary be-
cause tirades such as Ford's would "stir up animosity and
hatred against certain classes" and would lead to "breaches of
the peace."1"' He further stated that "[w]hether or not any
prosecution should ever take place under the New York Libel
Law were it to be amended as proposed, the effect of such a
law would in itself be salutary.""2 Two years later, in 1923,
Marshall also contacted the Postmaster General of the United
States to request a ban on certain materials containing adver-
tisements for the Dearborn Independent.13
-While the proposal to enact a criminal group libel law in
New York failed,"s4 the ADL pursued campaigns for similar
laws elsewhere.'85 Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland,
Columbus, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Toledo, and St. Louis tried to
ban the distribution of the newspaper. Furthermore, legis-
While we recognize that, from one point of view, there is merit in the
suggestion [of instituting some sort of libel proceeding], taking everything
into consideration we have come to the conclusion that it would not be
advisable to institute any libel suits against Ford .... We could not sue
for any injury done to the Jewish people of America . . . even though
they may be greatly wronged.
Letter from Louis Marshall to Felix Vorenberg (Apr. 26, 1921), in Reznikoff, supra
note 114, at 357.
.81 The proposed law would have banned the libel of "those belonging to any
race, religious denomination, sect or order against whom in whole or in part as a
class a malicious publication is directed." Letter from Louis Marshall to Governor
Nathan L. Miller, (Feb. 21, 1921), in Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 356.
182 Letter from Louis Marshall to Governor Nathan L. Miller, (Feb. 21, 1921), in
Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 356.
'83 See THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITIEE, MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMIT-
TEE MINUTES (Mar. 11, 1923) (on file with the American Jewish Committee ar-
chives).
184 See ROSENSTOCK, supra note 142, at 167-68.
18s See ROSENSTOCK, supra note 142, at 167; SACHAR, supra note 83, at 315.
186 See ROSENSTOCK, supra note 142, at 149-50; SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE
OF CIVIL LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 62 (1990) [hereinafter WALKER, IN
DEFENSE]. Most of the municipalities that attempted to prohibit the Dearborn
Independent were in the Midwest. This may have been because the ADL based its
operations in Chicago, and it hired an employee to help lobby against Ford. Inter-
view with Alexander F. Miller, in 5 NOT THE WORK OF A DAY, ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE OF BWNAI BmTH ORAL MEMOIRS 13 (Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
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lation to prohibit "general libel" that would encompass the
Dearborn Independent's anti-Semitism was introduced in the
Michigan state legislature.187 Significantly, these attempts
failed.
The reason is that free speech concerns were for the first
time being raised explicitly as a reason to oppose such stat-
utes. The bill in Michigan failed to pass the state senate be-
cause newspaper editors protested that the law would chill
legitimate criticism." The American Civil Liberties Union
(the "ACLU") protested against the ordinance in Cincin-
nati. 89 And federal judges in Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Cleve-
land invalidated the group libel ordinances in those cities."
The situation in Cleveland is worth discussing briefly to show
that resistance to group libel statutes based on freedom of
speech concerns had begun to take root not only amongst the
people but also in the federal judiciary.
Cleveland's ordinance was framed to ban publications
"calculated to excite scandal and having a tendency to create
breaches of the peace . . ."" When city officials attempted
to ban distribution of the newspaper by vendors on city
streets,'92 the Dearborn Independent sued in federal court for
an injunction against the city's actions. In support of the ban,
the mayor testified that distribution of the Dearborn Indepen-
dent "would tend to create religious and racial dissensions, and
have a tendency to create breaches of the peace.""9 3 However,
the court ruled in favor of the Dearborn Independent and
granted the injunction, without issuing a holding on the validi-
ty of the ordinance. Rather, the judge stated that the proper
action to take against the newspaper would be criminal prose-
B'rith ed., 1987). But the concentration of such laws in one region may be more
than a geographical coincidence. Of all the regions in the country, the Midwest
was the most supportive of Ford and the Dearborn Independent. See ROSENSTOCK,
supra note 142, at 151.
"7 See ROSENSTOCK, supra note 142, at 150.
2" See id.
18 See id.
19 See id.
191 Dearborn Publ'g Co. v. Fitzgerald, 271 F. 479, 480 (N.D. Ohio 1921) (sum-
marizing CLEVELAND OH., REV. ORDINANCES § 1770 (1919)).
192 But city officials did not attempt to ban the newspaper in news stands or
shops. See id. at 481.
190 Id.
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cution of its distributors, not prior restraint of its distribution.
The court further ruled that the publication had no tendency to
create breaches of the peace, since no disorder had broken out
because of the newspaper's distribution. The court also stated
that the Dearborn Independent could not "by any stretch of the
imagination be classified as indecent, obscene, or scandalous,"
which was the basis for action under the ordinance.'" But, in
dicta, the court questioned the ordinance's constitutionality:
If defendants' action were sustained, the constitutional liberty of
every citizen freely to speak, write, and publish his sentiments on
all subjects... would be placed at the mercy of every public official
who for the moment was clothed with authority to preserve the
public peace, and the right to a free press would likewise be de-
stroyed.
19
At the time of the decision in Dearborn, the Ohio court
was not alone in its concern with freedom of the press. In
1919, only two years before the Deaborn decision, the United
States Supreme Court started to contemplate granting greater
First Amendment protections. It did so in three cases decided
that year. 9 ' All three gave the federal government substan-
tial power to limit speech and concerned the Espionage Act of
1917, which Congress had passed to control anti-war dissent
during World War I.' In Schenck v. United States, 8 the
Supreme Court upheld the Espionage Act against a First
Amendment challenge. 9 Justice Holmes, ruling for the gov-
ernment, wrote a majority opinion that enunciated a test that
allowed the government wide latitude to suppress speech.2"
19 Id. at 482-83. The judge seemed to have a unique idea of group libel. Re-
sponding to the city's contention that publication of the Dearborn Independent
would tend to lead to a breach of the peace, the judge stated, "It would be a libel,
it seems to me, on people of the Jewish race to assume that they are imbued
with such a spirit of lawlessness." Dearborn, 271 F. at 483.
196 Id. at 485.
19 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
9 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917). See also G. EDWARD
WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 414-15, 573
n.14 (1993).
19 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
1 David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J.
514, 582-84 (1981).
" Holmes stated that the relevant inquiry was "whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
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Yet that decision, and two others decided soon after,2"'
sparked a barrage of criticism amongst the mainstream press
and legal academics.0 2 Indeed, after a summer of thought
and consultations,0 ' Holmes became more sympathetic to
First Amendment claims. Therefore, he decided to dissent with
Justice Brandeis in another Espionage Act case,2 Abrams v.
United States,0 5 where he stated, "Congress certainly cannot
forbid all effort to change the mind of the country."20 6
While the government prevailed in the three cases dis-
cussed above, adherence to the principle of freedom of expres-
sion was nevertheless becoming more widespread. Although
Holmes' change of heart is a conspicuous example of this trend,
he was far from alone in supporting it. In 1917, Judge Learned
Hand issued his decision in Masses Publishing Co. v. Pat-
ten, 2  enunciating a permissive stance towards freedom of
speech. In Masses, he stated that speech should be allowed
unless it was in "direct advocacy of resistance" to the law.08
Similarly, a number of scholars had started to consider the
importance of the First Amendment in the years preceding
World War 1.219 An organization called the Free Speech
League had been formed in 1902, and its successor, the ACLU,
was founded in 1920.210 With the end of World War I, the
popularity of such ideas would only grow.21'
It was not clear whether this judicial activism would affect
efforts to enact group libel statutes. None of the 1919 Supreme
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent." Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. See Fred D. Ragan, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., and the Clear and Present Danger
Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919 58 J. AM. HIST. 24 (1971) (arguing that
Holmes originally meant the test to be restrictive of free speech, and he only later
recast it to be protective of free speech).
201 See Debs, 249 U.S. 211; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. 204.
202 See Ragan, supra note 200, at 39-43; White, supra note 197, at 420-21.
20 See White, supra note 197, at 422-30.
204 Technically, the case involved the Sedition Act of 1918, which was an
amendment to the 1917 Espionage Act. See Ragan, supra note 200, at 43 & n.80.
200 250 U.S. 621 (1919).
206 Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
20 Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
208 Id. at 541.
209 See Rabban, supra note 199, at 559-82.
200 See WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 18, 174 n.5.
211 See PAUL L. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: FIRST AMEND-
MENT FREEDOMS FROM WILSON TO FDR 25-37 (1972).
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Court cases implicated libel or group libel directly. This is not
surprising, however, since libel was not seen as a First Amend-
ment issue throughout the nineteenth century.212 In fact, the
Supreme Court would not define the exact relationship be-
tween libel and the First Amendment for several years to
come.21 Also, since the First Amendment on its face only ap-
plies to Congress, it was unclear until 1921 what impact, if
any, an invigorated First Amendment would have on state
laws that regulated speech and on state group libel laws in
particular.14 Nevertheless, the tension between group libel
laws and the First Amendment was becoming evident. State
courts started to analyze the general law of libel in terms of
the First Amendment in the early 1900s.215 The ACLU pro-
tested against the municipal group libel ordinances listed
above, proclaiming that "the way to combat such [anti-Semitic]
views is by argument, not by prosecution."216 And, of course,
there is the Dearborn decision. As that decision indicates, sup-
porters of group libel statutes would have to consider both
constitutional and social issues. That is, group libel legislation
would not only have to gain support amongst American Jews
and various legislatures, but would also have to gain support
in federal courts that broadened First Amendment rights.
Perhaps as a result of all the actions taken against Ford,
he dropped the intensity of his campaign in 1922."7 While
the AJC stated in 1924 that "[the Dearborn Independent occa-
sionally reverts to its pet obsession,"1 ' the ADL stated that,
as of 1923, "[the Dearborn Independent is now being ig-
nored."1 9 But the Ford episode was not yet over.
21 See Rabban, supra note 199, at 550-51.
213 Indeed, the Supreme Court did not consider the intersection of libel and the
First Amendment until well into the twentieth century. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
21, The Supreme Court decided to incorporate the First Amendment to the
states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1921).
211 See Rabban, supra note 199, at 550-51.
216 WALKER, IN DEFENSE, supra note 186, at 62.
2 17 See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 316. Ford may have also been influenced by
the fact that the Protocols, which formed the foundation for his attacks, had been
discredited as a forgery in the London Times in 1921. See Mendes-Flohr &
Reinharz, supra note 106, at 409.
218 26 AM. JEWISH Y.B. 636 (1924).
21' BNAi B'RITH MANUAL, supra note 129, at 370.
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In 1924, the Dearborn Independent claimed that San Fran-
cisco attorney Aaron Sapiro and other Jews were using farm
cooperatives to seize control of the nation's agricultural re-
sources."' Sapiro, on behalf of "myself and my race," then
filed a $1 million libel suit against Ford.22' This was exactly
the type of lawsuit that Marshall had discouraged, claiming
that it would be too difficult to win and too damaging to the
public image of American Jews.222 Indeed, Marshall disap-
proved of Sapiro's actions." The case came to trial on March
15, 1927,224 but, a mistrial was declared, and before a new
court date could be set, Ford decided to back off. He settled the
case with Sapiro and issued a public apology, which he wrote
with the assistance of Marshall,228 for the content of the
Dearborn Independent over the previous several years.
Soon after, Ford disbanded the Dearborn Publishing Company.
Sapiro's lawsuit obviously contributed to Ford's decision to
issue his public apology. However, it is not clear that the pow-
er of a single group libel suit prompted Ford to repent. Two
earlier libel suits had been filed, with no apparent effect on
Ford. Rather, it seems that external concerns, such as his
concerns about the release of a new model car, his possible
presidential ambitions, or maybe his fear of testifying in court
led to his change of heart."
Even so, it is interesting to note how the case was per-
ceived amongst American Jews and what it signified as a
group libel case. The trial became something of a tabloid sen-
sation, and it was followed very closely by the Jewish
press.' The interest that the American Jewish public
showed in the case demonstrates that they saw it as an oppor-
22 See LEE, supra note 158, at 70-72; ROSENSTOCK, supra note 142, at 183-85;
SACHAR, supra note 83, at 316.
221 SACHAR, supra note 83, at 317.
See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
See Letter from Louis Marshall to G. Lowenstein (Mar. 29, 1927), in
Reznikoff, supra note 114, at 371.
2 See HARRY BENNETt, WE NEVER CALLED HIM HENRY 49 (1951).
See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 317-19. For details about the Sapiro-Ford
settlement, see also Aaron L. Sapiro, A Retrospective View of the Aaron Sapiro-
Henry Ford Case, W. ST. JEWISH HIST. Q. 79 (Oct. 1982).
226 See ROSENSTOCK, supra note 142, at 182-200.
2 See LEE, supra note 158, at 84-85; ROSENSTOCK, supra note 142, at 147, 187,
189, 190-96.
2 See LEE, supra note 158, at 71.
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tunity for the whole community to disprove the charges that
Ford made against Jews collectively. One Jewish magazine
called the "alleged Jewish conspiracy" the "principle issue" of
the case.229 At one point in the lawsuit, Ford's attorneys tried
to limit the scope of the suit to an individual libel action by
Sapiro. While they claimed that "lilt is not a trial of Jews, not
a trial of Judaism," Sapiro's lawyer replied, "Well, I do not
know how the court can say it is not here. That is the very
gravamen of the complaint."' 0 The Jewish public was appar-
ently disappointed when the trial judge ruled that the only
issue to be litigated would be whether the farm cooperatives
were as powerful and corrupt as Ford claimed, and the entire
issue of a Jewish conspiracy would not be pursued."1 Indeed,
Marshall lost interest in the case after the judge refused to
consider the allegations of a Jewish conspiracy. He wrote that
"[t]he court has eliminated from consideration the infamous
charges made by the Jews, as such, and Sapiro could not rep-
resent the Jews in fighting for their honor."232
This wide interest in the case indicates that, as late as
1927, Jews widely supported the regulation of group libel. But,
perhaps more importantly, it shows that the support for such
regulation was motivated by a theory that aimed to protect the
group itself, rather than by a theory that sought to protect
individuals from being tarred with group characteristics. Jews
were not insulted because Sapiro had been falsely charged
with participating in a Jewish conspiracy; they were insulted
because Jews had been falsely charged with conspiracy in the
first place.
The entire Ford incident left a bitter aftertaste. The fail-
ure of the group libel ordinances, along with the unsatisfactory
legal outcome of Sapiro's lawsuit, left the Jews doubtful about
the potential for group libel statutes in America, especially in
See Robert S. Marx, Background of Ford Charges; Dearborn Independent
Articles Basis of Sapiro Suit for Libel, 120 AM. HEBREW 636, 636 (Mar. 18, 1927).
2'O Id. at 674.
2 See LEE, supra note 158, at 72; Legal Clash of Sapiro and Ford, 120 AM.
HEBREW 691 (Mar. 25, 1927).
' Letter from Louis Marshall to G. Lowenstein (Mar. 29, 1927), in Reznikoff,
supra note 114, at 371.
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light of the growing importance of the First Amendment. In-
deed, the head of the ADL lamented years later in 1935:
The constitutional guarantee of free speech and free press, which we
in common with all true Americans regard as a fundamental neces-
sity to the maintenance of liberty and other constitutional guaran-
ties, was never intended as a protection against group libel any
more than against individual libel. Nevertheless, it forms an insur-
mountable obstacle in bringing before the bar of justice one of the
lowest type of malefactors. 3
Part V explores whether, as time progressed, Jews would
continue to want such group-based protections at all.
V. UPWARD JEWISH MOBILITY BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS
Regardless of whether or not the vitriol of Ford's Dearborn
Independent had much effect on the daily lives of American
Jews, 4 Jews faced other formidable obstacles of discrimina-
tion. One of the most celebrated instances occurred in 1922,
when Harvard University announced its intention to impose
quotas on the number of Jews it would accept. An internal
committee advised against such a policy, but, in 1925, Harvard
went ahead and reduced the proportion of Jews admitted from
25% to 10% of the student body." The Harvard episode was
significant mainly because it gave some legitimacy to a trend
that had been growing for some time. By the 1940s, Jews faced
barriers not only in colleges but also in secondary schools,
graduate schools, professional schools, law firms, commercial
banks, business firms, college fraternities and athletics, coun-
try-clubs, and in restrictive covenants placed on residential
property. 6
B'NAI B RITH PROC., supra note 129, at 201.
However, Ford's diatribes may well have had a disastrous impact on the
lives of European Jews. Adolph Hitler once said, "I regard Henry Ford as my in-
spiration." DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 158, at 83.
2' See, e.g., HIGHAM, SEND THESE, supra note 57, at 160; RAPHAEL, supra note
92, at 272-77; Marcia Graham Synnott, Anti-Semitism and American Universities:
Did Quotas Follow the Jews?, in ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY 233-34
(David A. Gerber ed., 1986).
"' See BROUN & BRrIrT, supra note 141, at 80, 118-24; HENRY L. FENGOLD, A
TIME FOR SEARCHING: ENTERING THE MAINSTREAM 1920-1945 1-34 (1992); GOREN,
supra note 55, at 77; HIGHAM, SEND THESE, supra note 57, at 158-59; Synnott,
supra note 235, at 233-66. It is interesting to note that the practice of excluding
Jews from hotels, which had prompted Marshall to campaign for the 1913 New
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But, even though Jews could not get into Harvard so easi-
ly, they still pursued higher education. In 1931 in New York,
the city with the highest number of Jews in terms of both per-
centage and raw numbers, Jews made up 22.5% of the student
population at Columbia (even after it instituted quotas), 36.5%
at New York University, and 80-90% at both the City College
of New York and Hunter College. 7 Aside from those four
year schools, throngs more studied at two-year colleges."'
While firmer quotas existed at medical schools, by the end of
the 1920s, 18% of medical students in America and 35% of
medical students in New York were Jews.2 39 Law schools of-
fered even wider opportunities; by 1930 over half of the mem-
bers of the bar in New York City were Jewish.24 And, if Jew-
ish law students were generally excluded from the most promi-
nent firms, they found work as practicing lawyers neverthe-
less, either in their own smaller firms, in social services, or in
government.24 Jews also made headway in trade, with about
60% of Jews holding jobs in that area, compared to half that
percentage in the general population.242 American Jews also
attained prominence in the entertainment field. Essentially, by
the 1930s, Jews had established themselves firmly in the
American middle class.243
Also, despite increased social discrimination, virulent anti-
Semitism declined in the mid-1920s.24 This was due partially
York law, fell out of favor. This development was probably due to the popularity
of the automobile, which increased pressure to net a larger catch of shorter-staying
guests. See HIGHAM, SEND THESE, supra note 57, at 161-62.
See BRrIr & BROUN, supra note 141, at 72.
See id. at 72, 102-04.
2" See id. at 102-03.
240 See id. at 104.
241 See id. at 125, 150, 152, 162-63, 166-73; FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 141,
212; SACHAR, supra note 83, at 333, 430. Even so, the path to employment was
difficult. A saying at the time called a career in the law for young Jews a "digni-
fied road to starvation." FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 141.
2" See GOREN, supra note 55, at 73-77.
23 See id. The white collar jobs that Jews generally took also helped them to
weather the Great Depression, though they still suffered considerable hardship
during those years. See Nathan Glazer, Social Characteristics of American Jews,
1654-1954, 56 AM. JEWISH Y.B. 3, 20 (1955); FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 150-52.
24 See, e.g., GOREN, supra note 55, at 82; DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM, supra
note 158, at 100. This decline in virulent anti-Semitism occurred despite the rise
of the Ku Klux Klan during the same years. While the Klan posed a constant
challenge to American Jews during the 1920s and 1930s, it did not begin a con-
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to the economic boom of the times and partially to the persua-
sive and non-legal efforts of the Jewish defense groups. Indeed,
in 1926, even before Ford issued his apology, the ADL noted
that the reduction of anti-Semitism allowed it to expand its
efforts towards educational, rather than defensive, projects."45
Jews were also becoming more acculturated to American
society. With immigration cut off, the second-generation Jews
started to define the face of American Judaism, and they want-
ed to look American. Therefore, they abandoned Yiddish and
Yiddish newspapers in favor of English, and they often
changed their last names to avoid sounding so "Jewish.""'6
The communal and fraternal organizations that played such an
important role in their parents' lives slowly disappeared. Those
organizations that survived provided less kinsmanship and
nurture and more loans and insurance policies.24" As Ameri-
can Jews absorbed the lessons of college, religion played an
ever diminishing role in their lives, and they took on a more
secularist and universalist outlook.248
Perhaps nothing demonstrates the growing assimilation of
American Jews better than politics. Jews became essential
partners in the coalition that elected Franklin Roosevelt in
1932, the year that marked the first time that Jews voted en
masse for the Democratic ticket. 9 They not only helped to
elect Roosevelt, they also worked for him." Felix Frankfurt-
er and the young Harvard Law School graduates whom he
directed to Washington25 stood as a vivid example of how
American Jews, when judged by their individual merits, could
enter the mainstream, and the establishment, of American life.
certed campaign to inflict egregious physical harm onto Jews. See FEINGOLD, supra
note 236, at 3, 34; see generally NANCY MACLEAN, BEHIND THE MASK OF CHIVALRY
(1994). Even so, the potential was always there; the twentieth century manifes-
tation of the Klan, after all, began in the aftermath of the Leo Frank lynching.
See MACLEAN, supra, at 145.
245 See BNAI Bl'I=I MANUAL, supra note 129, at 367.
211 See DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITSM, supra note 158, at 124; FEINGOLD, supra
note 236, at 70, 75, 88.
24 See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 59.
24 See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 58; DINNERSTIN, ANTI-SEMiTISM, supra
note 158, at 124.
24, See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 204.
' See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 446-50.
2" See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 217-18; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 326 (1988).
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Given this success, it is not surprising that respect for individ-
ual merit ranked high amongst Jews. The response that Mar-
shall offered to protest the Harvard quotas is telling. He stated
that "[t]he only tests that we can recognize [for admission] are
those of character and scholarship." 2
Despite this increased trend to assimilate and rely on
individual ability, Jewish social and cultural affiliation did not
disappear. Unprecedented numbers of Jews joined the Reform
branch of Judaism in the 1920s, while at the same time, Con-
servative Judaism was formed and began to thrive."' In ad-
dition to strictly religious associations, American Jews joined
any number of secular Jewish organizations, from community
centers, to charity associations, to Jewish defense leagues, to
womens' leagues, to Zionist support groups.' But, while the
movement to join such organizations gained momentum, it is
important to recognize its significance-that it was up to the
individual Jews to join on a voluntary basis."
While the American Jewish community tended to develop
along such assimilationist and voluntaristic lines, there were
still counter movements that tried to institute formal recogni-
tion of the Jewish community and of Jewish group rights.
Perhaps the most vivid example was a suggestion by Zangwill,
the author of THE MELTING POT, to organize a formalized Jew-
ish voting block. He stated, in a speech in 1923, that he found
it "beyond question" that American Jews should organize their
numbers into a single and unified voting party. He argued that
"it is the positive duty of the religious body to seek political
ends" and that "[if there is no Jewish vote today-and by a
Jewish vote I do not mean a vote for Jews-it is a disgrace, not
a policy to be commended."256 Therefore, unless American
Jews organized, their close physical proximity and cultural
252 GOREN, supra note 55, at 83.
25 See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 99-100, 103-06.
' See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 100, 155, 186-87; SACHAR, supra note 83,
at 408-12.
' See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 89-90. It is interesting to note that labor
unions in America, which also confronted issues pertaining to group rights during
this century, ultimately took a similarly "voluntaristic" stance towards the Federal
Government. See generally WILLAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1989).
2'r ZANGWILL, WATCHMAN, supra note 95, at 10-11, 13.
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institutions would only serve as a partial bulwark to ward off
assimilation, and would become "more food for The Melting
Pot.v "
7
Despite his pleas, Zangwill knew that his thinking was not
in line with the views held by the majority of American Jews.
He stated in the speech that he had received warnings that his
idea was "dangerous and un-American." 8 For example, Mar-
shall stated that he disagreed "totally with Mr. Zangwill" and
that Jews "in foreign lands suffered from the consequences of
an enforced segregation of this character, and they would not
be so fatuous as to create voluntarily a condition which in
effect would establish an American ghetto."=9
Other episodes of attempts to formalize group rights also
occurred. Some Jews waged a campaign, ultimately successful,
to have New York City's public schools teach Hebrew as a
foreign language."' Yet the campaign was a flimsy founda-
tion on which to build a movement for government sanctioned
group rights, since Yiddish, not Hebrew, was the language of
Jewish culture in America.261 Later attempts to have the
school system recognize Jewish holidays and allow release-time
programs for religious instruction were even less success-
ful. 2 However, support for Zionism reached a new high in
the mid-1930s, following a prior decline in its popularity."
But, as was the case with religion, association with Zionist
causes was strictly voluntary. Moreover, an attempt to create a
new form of religious Judaism called Reconstructionism advo-
cated an emphasis on community. But while the movement
reaped significant praise, it was met with little popular back-
ing."' And of course, as discussed previously in this article,
there were the failed attempts to institute group libel statutes
and law suits in response to Ford's Dearborn Independent.
25 Id. at 13. It is interesting to note that Zangwill's comments here seem to
completely contradict the sentiments he expressed in his play, THE MELTING POT.
" Id. at 11.
2' 26 AM. JEWISH Y.B. 72-73 (1924).
260 See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 55.
261 See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 55.
26 See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 120-21.
263 See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 176-85.
26 See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 111-15.
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Thus, while there was some support amongst American
Jews for formal recognition of the group and its rights, such
episodes were mainly noteworthy for their lack of success.
Similarly, it is interesting to note that, at the same time, at-
tempts to install regimes of national minority rights in Europe,
dating from the Versailles treaty following World War I, also
became acknowledged as failures.2"
To be clear, the failure of American Jews to institute
group rights did not indicate a lack of Jewish religious and
cultural identity in America. Rather, American Jews resolved
the tension between the importance of assimilation and the
importance of heritage by identifying with their Judaism on a
voluntary basis. For instance, they may have refused to sup-
port a formalized Jewish vote, but they still supported Presi-
dent Roosevelt with virtual unanimity. Moreover, they failed to
institute time-release programs for Jewish study, but they still
joined synagogues and provided for their children's religious
instruction. As Zangwill said in his 1923 speech, American
Jewry had "answered... in the affirmative" its intent to
"stand out against The Melting Pot."266 But if American
Jews refused to disappear, they also refused to have their
ethnic identity and affiliation defined or protected by the gov-
ernment.
This apparent resolution to the conffict between assimilat-
ing and maintaining ethnic heritage was tracked in the aca-
demic literature about pluralism in America. Academics soft-
ened the sharp boundaries between the melting pot and
pluralistic conceptions of what it meant to be American. Fur-
thermore, the assimilationists recognized that it would be
impossible for citizens to completely shed their ethnic pasts.
But, at the same time, it also became clear that a group's "re-
tention of cultural diversity could not preclude substantial
conformity with general American norms."267 Social scientists
helped accelerate this trend, since new work in their field
exposed racism and bigotry as cultural constructs, rather than
social or eugenic facts.2"
26 See FEINGOLD, supra note 236, at 206.
26 ZANGWILL, WATCHMAN, supra note 95, at 10.
267 Id. at 578.
26 See Richard Weiss, Ethnicity and Reform, 66 J. AM. HIST. 566, 567, 570-74
(1979).
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Thus, the years between World War I and World War II
were transformative for American Jews in many ways. First,
social discrimination became commonplace to a degree never
seen before. Even so, American Jews managed to attain high
levels of education, which in turn helped them get jobs that
placed them solidly in the American middle class. Second,
assimilation increased with education and (relative) prosperity.
While this assimilation to some extent diminished ethnic and
religious affiliation, the assimilationist impulse also manifest-
ed itself in the guise of a reconstituted American Judaism.
However, Jews were unwilling to totally abandon their heri-
tage, but instead saw assimilation as a voluntary enterprise.
Attempts to formalize Jewish affiliation under government
auspices generally failed. Thus, the group rights versus indi-
vidual rights debates from the earlier part of the 1900s became
resolved, at least temporarily. Third, American Jews saw
themselves primarily as individuals, without the inclination or
the need to have an official Jewish community intervene be-
tween them and the state. In theory, it would still be possible
for American Jews to support group libel laws while staying
faithful to the creed of individualism. For example, Jews who
wanted to be judged as individuals might support laws that
punished people who advocated attributing individual Jews
with traits supposedly characteristic of the group in general.
Yet, whether American Jews would actually support such an
individualistic defense of group libel laws in the years that fol-
lowed remained to be seen and is discussed in Part VI.
VI. WORLD WAR II AND BEYOND
With Hitler's ascendence to power in 1933, anti-Semitism
increased in America.26" Between 1933 and 1941, 100 new
anti-Semitic organizations appeared, while only a handful had
existed in America before that time.27 For instance, the Sil-
ver Shirts and the German-American Bund appeared as Nazi
franchises in America.Y Moreover, Father Charles Coughlin
219 See, e.g., DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 158, at 107; SACHAR, su-
pra note 83, at 450-58.
270 See DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 158, at 112.
27, See, e.g., DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 158, at 112; SACHAR, su-
pra note 83, at 481.
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started broadcasting anti-Semitic tirades from the radio waves
in 1938.272 America's entry into World War II boosted intoler-
ance even more,273 and by 1945, 58% of Americans believed
that Jews had too much power. 4
In response, American Jews emphasized the same individ-
ualistic and assimilative characteristics that had served them
so well in the preceding decade. They stressed their Ameri-
canism, their patriotism, "their bravery, their athletic ability,
[and] their 'all-rightness.'"2 7 They also publicized their re-
spect for American legal values and for civil liberties in partic-
ular. An AJC letter explains the efforts that the organization
took to combat "anti-Jewish hostility" in the United States. It
stated, "The fundamental appeal is to the basic principles of
America, the ideals which the people of this country regard as
precious, (Bill of Rights-freedom of speech, press and assem-
bly, equity before the law)."275
The notion that civil liberties constituted the core of Amer-
ican ideals was an idea that was gaining wide support outside
the Jewish community as well. Some Americans, especially
intellectuals, tried to distinguish themselves from European
Fascists by emphasizing tolerance and individual rights in the
United States.277 Moreover, the ACLU began to win First
Amendment battles in the courts in the early 1930s, with ap-
parent public approval.2 7' And the labor movement in Ameri-
ca, always a strong advocate of freedom of speech and assem-
272 See DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 158, at 115.
273 See DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 158, at 131.
274 See DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 158, at 146.
275 DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 158, at 147-48.
17' Letter from unknown AJC staffer to Jesse Steinhart 1 (Mar. 28, 1936) (on
file with the American Jewish Committee archives, Chronological File, Jan.-June,
1936). As early as the mid-1920s, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, the
umbrella organization of Reform rabbis, had advocated increased freedom of ex-
pression, condemning, "all interference, whether by private citizens or by officials
with the exercise of freedom of speech, oral or written." MURPHY, supra note 211,
at 32.
'7 See MURPHY, supra note 211, at 279-80; Geoffrey D. Berman, A New Deal
for Free Speech: Free Speech and the Labor Movement in the 1930s, 80 VA. L.
REv. 291, 292 n.8 (1994); Richard W. Steele, The War on Intolerance: The Refor-
mulation of American Nationalism, 1939-1941, 9 J. OF AM. ETHNIC HIST. 9 (1989).
278 WALKER, IN DEFENSE, supra note 186, at 90-92.
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bly, gained increased power and respectability with the ascen-
dence of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal."9
This growing popularity of freedom of expression in Ameri-
ca, and the decision of American Jews to prove their patriotism
by stressing their support for civil liberties, heavily influenced
the way that Jews responded to the anti-Semitism and group
libel of the age. Just as the decision of American Jews to pur-
sue an individualistic conception of life during the 1920s made
it impossible to rely on a defense of hate-speech based on
group rights, the increasing popularity of civil liberties in gen-
eral and of freedom of expression in particular during the
1930s made it difficult to rely on a defense of group libel laws
based on individual rights.
Thus, when the AJC began to formulate a coherent group
libel policy in 1935, as is discussed below, it considered three
issues: whether group libel prosecutions would be prudential,
whether they would be possible without statutory reform, and
whether the Constitution would sanction such prosecutions,
whatever the statutory authority.
First, the AJC questioned the advisability of group libel
prosecutions. The organization noted that there was a "rising
flood" of anti-Semitic literature in America.28 But the AJC
doubted that trials for group libel would remedy the problem
because of difficulties such as the publicity that the defendants
would be granted during their trials, the unpredictability and
potential biases of juries, and the danger that defendants
might be acquitted."8 Indeed, by advocating group libel pros-
ecutions or statutes, Jews opened themselves up to the charge
that they held exactly the form of power that hatemongers
accused them of holding.282 The AJC was also leery because
of the dubious legacy of group libel prosecutions in Germany
preceding the Nazi takeover. A memo on this topic stated, "[Iln
most Jewish circles gradually the feeling arose that by suing
the defamers almost more harm than good would be accom-
' See Klarman, supra note 12, at 40-43. See generally Berman, supra note 277.
2S Letter from Morris D. Waldman to friends (June, 1935) (on file with the
American Jewish Committee archives, Chronological File, May-July, 1935).
" See id.
2-See LEGAL RECOURSE AGAINST ANTI-JEWISH PROPAGANDA 4 (May 5, 1935) (on
file with the American Jewish Committee archives, Chronological File, May-July,
1935).
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plished for the Jewish cause; if, after all, the Jewish party
eventually succeeded, such success, it was generally felt, was
in the nature of a Pyrric victory."'
Second, it was not clear that existing statutes or laws
would support group libel prosecutions. Another AJC memo
suggested that existing criminal libel statutes might suffice to
prosecute group libelers.' Even so, the memo noted that
"there is no reported case in New York directly passing upon
the liability for defamation of a class under these sections of
the Penal law,"285 a fact which should not be minimized in
any discussion of the wisdom of proceeding under these stat-
utes. It also noted that the number of group libel prosecutions
based on the law of criminal libel would be limited because of
the requirement of linking such prosecutions to a breach of the
peace." 6 And, in all defamation prosecutions in New York at
the time, the defendant would be acquitted if the defamatory
statement were true or if there were reasonable grounds for
such a belief. 7
Third, the AJC was acutely aware of constitutional con-
cerns. The organization insisted that "no action should be tak-
en which could in any way jeopardize, or be interpreted as
jeopardizing, the fundamental guarantees of freedom of speech
and of the press."288 This consideration made it especially dif-
ficult to advocate new legislation that would prohibit group
libel for several reasons. First, the Supreme Court had ruled in
1931 in Near v. Minnesota"9 that the Constitution would not
allow local authorities to shut down a publication that charged
them with corruption. Therefore, the AJC was concerned that
any new legislation that banned group libel would constitute a
2" Memo from Dr. Derenberg to Mr. Waldman, in ANALYSIS OF GROUP LIBEL IN
GERMANY 4 (May 3, 1935) (on file with the American Jewish Committee archives,
Chronological Files, May-July, 1935).
284 See MEMORANDUM RE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFAMATION OF THE
JEWS (June 1, 1935), at 6 (on file with the American Jewish Committee Archives,
Chronological File, May-July, 1935).
285 Id.
28 See id. at 2.
21 See id. at 6; see also People v. Sherlock, 56 A.D. 422 (1st Dep't 1900), aff'd
166 N.Y. 180, 68 N.Y.S. 74 (1901).
28 Letter from Morris D. Waldman to friends (June, 1935) (on file with the
American Jewish Committee archives, Chronological File, May-July, 1935).
289 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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prior restraint, and therefore would violate the rule articulated
in Near.2' Even laws that merely fined group libelers, and
thus, avoided the prior restraint issue, ran into other First
Amendment concerns. Furthermore, if the AJC advocated such
laws, it risked handicapping the fight against anti-Semitism.
As one AJC memo stated, "By alienating the support of liberals
and the press, an attempt to secure such [group libel] legisla-
tion may incur the opposition of just those elements whose
assistance is most needed in combating anti-Jewish propagan-
da."291
Thus, by 1935, the AJC decided to oppose group libel legis-
lation and prosecutions. Instead, the organization suggested
that "it may be the part of wisdom to adopt other means of
defending the civil rights of Jews," such as through educational
programs.
292
Despite the AJC's stance, there were still attempts to
prosecute group libelers and to pass group libel laws. New
Jersey passed a group libel law in 1935 that prohibited any
written or spoken statement, "which in any way in any part
thereof, incites, counsels, promotes, or advocates hatred, vio-
lence, or hostility against any group or groups of persons resid-
ing or being in this state, by reason of race, religion or manner
of worship."293 Similarly, Massachusetts passed a law in
1943, providing that "whoever publishes any false written or
printed material with intent to maliciously promote hatred of
any group of persons in the commonwealth because of race,
color or religion shall be guilty of libel" and pay $1,000 or
spend a year in jail or both.2  Indiana passed a similar law,
and New York, Ohio, and Rhode Island all considered, but
ultimately rejected, such legislation.2 5 There were also at-
290 See LEGAL RECOURSE AGAINST ANTI-JEWISH PROPAGANDA, supra note 282,
at 4.
291 Letter from Morris D. Waldman to friends, supra note 288.
29 Letter from Harry Schneiderman to Members of the Executive Committee 2
(Apr. 3, 1936) (on file with the American Jewish Committee archives, Chronologi-
cal Files, Jan.-June 1936).
293 See Martha Glaser, The German American Bund in New Jersey, 92 NEW
JERSEY HIST. 33, 36-37 (1974) (quoting 1935 N.J. LAWS 151, 2(a)). The group libel
law was apparently passed as part of a broader effort by state officials to crack
down on the German American Bund. See id.
214 MASS. GEN. LAWS c.272, § 98c (1943); 28 MASS. L. Q. 104 (1943) (quoting
the BOSTON HERALD, May 28, 1943).
295 See WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 52, 83; LEGAL RECOURSE
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tempts to pass federal laws that aimed to ban group defama-
tion from the federal mails, dating back to 1935.296
The fate of those laws that did make it onto the books
indicates that the AJC's policy to oppose such laws was well
suited to the times. The Massachusetts law had a slow death;
prosecutions were brought under it at least until the
1950s.' 7 The New Jersey law met a more sudden end. In
New Jersey v. Klapprott,"5 following arguments presented by
the ACLU, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the first
conviction secured under the law, deeming the statute violative
of freedom of expression as guaranteed in the Federal Consti-
tution and the New Jersey State Constitution.2" Moreover,
the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically noted that the
spoken libel that Klapprott was charged with deserved more
protection than written libels.' This sentiment would as-
sume some significance when the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of group libel.3"'
While the very existence of such statutes shows that not
all American Jews agreed with the AJC's views about group
libel,"2 one New York case, People v. Edmonson, °' illus-
trates particularly well the deliberations within the Jewish
community about the wisdom of supporting group libel laws in
AGAINST ANTI-JEWISH PROPAGANDA, supra note 282, at 3 (May 7, 1935).
'1 See WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 83-86; Riesman, Group Libel,
supra note 2, at 733 n.27; Symposium, NCRAC Legislative Information Bulletin,
Federal Group Libel Legislation: Should Jews and Jewish Organizations Support or
Oppose? 1, 7 (June 10, 1949) (on file with the American Jewish Congress archives)
[hereinafter Symposium].
Interestingly, attempts to have Congress investigate Nazi and fascist groups
in America led to the creation of the House Special Committee on Un-American
Activities ("HUAC") in 1938, which soon switched its main focus to Communists.
See WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 60. The HUAC eventually took on
arguably anti-Semitic overtones in its hunts for Reds.
29 See Paul F. Ferguson, A Consideration of the Massachusetts Group Libel
Law, 32 B.U. L. REV. 414, 416-17 (1952).
, 22 A.2d 877 (N.J. 1941).
29 See id. at 883.
'o See id. at 880.
301 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 n.23 (1951). See also Glaser,
supra note 293, at 45.
"o The Massachusetts group libel law illustrates this point well. It was passed
by the Massachusetts state legislature after a single rabbi lobbied for it. See 28
MASS. L. Q., supra note 294, at 104.
"o' 168 Misc. 141, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1938).
[Vol. 66: 1
2000] GROUP RIGHTS, AMERICAN JEWS, AND GROUP LIBEL LAWS 123
the 1930s. On June 8, 1936, New York mayor Fiorello
LaGuardia issued a warrant for the arrest of anti-Semitic
pamphleteer Robert Edmondson."4 The charge was criminal
libel."0 5 LaGuardia reaped praise from Jewish newspapers,
New York Jewish clubs, and American Jewish Congress Presi-
dent Stephen S. Wise, who criticized the AJC's stance against
such prosecutions." 6 Wise wrote to LaGuardia, "[T]he sh-sh
Jews who, instead of rejoicing over what you have done, are
chiefly fearful lest, as they put it, Edmondson has his day in
court-as if he had not had it already, through the publication
of millions of pamphlets!"0 7
Yet before the Edmonson case came to trial, the American
Jewish Congress changed its mind, and filed a brief, along
with the AJC and several other Jewish groups, opposing the
prosecution. It is unclear why the American Jewish Congress
changed its mind. Perhaps the sheer amount of time that it
took to prosecute the Edmonson case convinced it that group
libel trials would be arduous, and therefore undesirable. Or,
maybe the American Jewish Congress merely decided that the
Edmondson case was inappropriate as a test case. In any
event, the brief questioned "whether the cause of religious
liberty and tolerance will be advanced by this particular prose-
cution" and stated that the organizations "are convinced that
the true and effective reply to the propaganda of bigots lies not
in the invocation of criminal libel laws but in a campaign of
education fostered by all groups."0 ' The judge ultimately
ruled in favor of Edmondson, stating, "We must suffer the
demagogue and the charlatan, in order to make certain that
we do not limit or restrain the honest commentator on public
' See Dov Fisch, The Libel Trial of Robert Edward Edmondson, 71 AM. JEW-
ISH HIST. 79, 89 (1981).
3" See Edmonson, 168 Misc. at 142, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
See Fisch, supra note 304 at 91-93. The American Jewish Congress that
Wise headed was the organization's second manifestation. After the Versailles
Treaty following World War I was ratified, the original Congress, mentioned in
Part II, was disbanded. The new one was formed in 1922. See SACHAR, supra note
83, at 410.
" Fisch, supra note 304, at 93.
3OR Brief for the American Jewish Committee on Religious Rights and Minorities,
The American Jewish Committee, The American Jewish Congress, and the Human
Relations Committee of the National Council of Women at 2, 5, Edmondson 168
Misc. 141, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1938) (on file with the
American Jewish Committee archives, Legal Briefs, 1938).
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affairs." 9 While the American Jewish Congress later reaf-
firmed its support for group libel laws,310 it is significant that
its dedication to the cause wavered during an actual prosecu-
tion.
The issue of group libel prosecutions vexed not only the
Jewish community in America but also legal scholars. Between
1934 and 1954, numerous law review articles addressed the
issue; they, debated both the advisability and constitutionality
of group libel statutes, and even proposed model statutes.
One of the most influential articles was David Riesman's 1942
article, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel.312
Since it is generally acknowledged as the best defense of group
libel statutes,1 3 it deserves a closer examination.1
Riesman devoted much of the article to tracing the history
of group libel and describing contemporary group libel law in
America and Europe. Yet the importance of his work is not the
o Edmondson, 168 Misc. at 154, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
310 See infra notes 334-339 and accompanying text.
311 See, e.g., Nathan D. Perlman & Morris Ploscowe, False Defamatory and Anti-
Racial and Anti-Religious Propaganda and the Use of the Mails, 4 LAW. GUILD
REv. 13 (1944); Tanenhaus, supra note 2; Irving Wilner, The Civil Liability Aspects
of Defamation Directed Against A Collectivity, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 414 (1942); Abor-
tive Efforts, supra note 6; Note, Constitutional Law: Curtailment of Speech Inciting
to Race Hatred and the Protection of Minorities, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1942);
Note, Freedom of Speech and Group Libel Statutes, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 211
(1941) [hereinafter Freedom of Speech]; Liability for Defamation, supra note 6;
Statutory Prohibition, supra note 6 (including proposed model group libel statute).
The American Jewish Congress printed a bibliography which cites fifty such arti-
cles. See CLSA REPORTS, A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON GROUP LIBEL (June 16,
1948) (on file with the American Jewish Congress archives). The ACLU also print-
ed a defense of its decision to oppose group libel statutes. ACLU, SHALL WE DE-
FEND FREE SPEECH FOR NAZIS IN AMERICA? (1934).
" Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2. The article was part of a trilogy of
articles. The other two are Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and
Fair Comment I, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (1942) [hereinafter Riesman, Fair Game
11; Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment II, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 1282 (1942) [Riesman, Fair Game Ill. They dealt with political
defamation directed against individuals.
313 See WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 79 ("The most important state-
ment in support of restricting offensive racial and religious speech was a three-
part series of articles by David Riesman, in 1942. Fifty years later these articles
are still regularly cited as the principal authority on the subject.").
31' See WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 79-83. Walker suggests that
Riesman's series is important mainly because it recognizes the importance of mass
communication to changing public opinion in modem society, and the power of
sociology to resolve group libel questions by examining the social context of any
given case. See WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 79-83.
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historical examination, but rather the reasons he articulates
for analyzing the topic in the first place. He argued that group
libel statutes are necessary to protect democracy from fascist
influences. While he recognized that Nazis used the law of
defamation to help seize and maintain power,315 he claimed
that "[t]here is no inherent reason why it cannot be a weapon
for democracy." 16 Yet his conception of democracy is peculiar.
For Riesman, democracy depended on the primacy of
groups within a nation. "In the political as in the economic
struggle," he argued, "modern democracy operates through the
interplay of group activities, and it is through participation in
groups that persons contribute to the social welfare and devel-
op their individual capacities."317 Therefore, according to
Riesman, America needed to protect its groups in order to
preserve democracy. As he stated, "[D]efamatory attacks on
groups are attacks both on the pluralistic forces which make
up a democratic society and derivatively on the individual
members whose own status derives from their group affilia-
tions."318
Yet this conception of a democracy based on group rights
contradicted fundamental assumptions of American democracy.
Indeed, Riesman recognized that his views did not jibe with
those held generally, and he confessed, "[The traditions of
individualism are more powerful in the United States than
elsewhere."319 This individualistic tradition has important
consequences:
[D]efamatory attacks upon social groups are pretty much outside the
scope of existing law [in America], and the discovery of an adequate
defense for groups must cope not only with many technical obstacles
but with the customary refusal of American law to appreciate the
role of groups in the social process .... I am inclined, however, to
suspect that it is the American heritage of middle-class individualis-
tic liberalism, rather than these technical difficulties, which has so
far impeded our creation of a vigorous public policy for the handling
of group libels.'
See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 728-30.
'1' Riesman, Fair Game II, supra note 312, at 1318.
17 Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 731.
"' Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 731.
Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 730.
320 Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 730-31, 734.
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Riesman noted that American law had overcome technical
obstacles to group libel prosecutions in certain instances, such
as with corporations, partnerships, and labor unions. 21 Yet,
"[wihere we are dealing with groups at large ... there are no
such handles for the law."322
Riesman concluded his article by addressing possible con-
flicts between increased prohibition of group libel and freedom
of expression. He noted that the conflict may not be so great
because the constitutional right only covered "fair comment,"
which might be accommodated by insisting that truth operate
as a defense to any group libel prosecution.3 ' But his main
argument was not that the United States Constitution, as con-
strued in 1942, could support group libel prosecutions. Rather,
he argued that the circumstances of the day justified a reinter-
pretation of the Constitution so as to allow such prosecutions.
He stated:
In the more or less democratic lands, however, the threat of fascism
and the chief dangers to freedom of discussion do not spring from
the "state," but from "private" fascist groups in the community ....
In this state of affairs, it is no longer tenable to continue a negative
policy of protection from the state; such a policy, in concrete situa-
tions, plays directly into the hands of the groups whom supporters of
democracy need most to fear.32
Thus, Riesman articulated a bold advocacy of group libel.
In his view, the American government had a duty to protect its
constituent groups to uphold democracy. If that meant
reconceptualizing American society to diminish the role of the
individual and instead to grant primacy to social groups, so be
it. With that social change done, any legal problems would
take care of themselves.
There are two significant points to be drawn from
Riesman's work. First, Riesman's vision of democracy exactly
parallels Horace Kallen's vision of America-a vision based on
groups formally recognized by the government. Riesman's de-
fense of group libel laws, as the above quotation demonstrates,
flows directly from this earlier group rights conception of
321 See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 756-57, 761-63.
Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 763.
'" See Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 777-78.
"1' Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 779, 780.
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American life. Second, and equally striking, is how little sup-
port existed by the 1940s for Riesman's group rights based
conception of society.
Kallen's view of America had diminished by the end of the
1920s. At that time, American Jews had essentially pursued
an individualistic conception of life in America and limited
their group affiliations to voluntary associations. Thus, as his
article explicitly recognized, Riesman's vision contradicted the
social landscape of American life in the 1940s. Therefore, any-
one who wished to use Riesman's reasoning to support stronger
group libel laws might be forced into the position of advocating
a fundamental reorganization of American society. And neither
Americans in general nor American Jews in particular seemed
inclined to undertake such a pursuit at so late a date. Indeed,
as has been discussed earlier in this Article, American Jews
decided to combat the rising anti-Semitism in America by ad-
vocating individual rights even more strongly than they had
before.3"
Also, advocacy of group libel laws, at least at an abstract
level, did not need to be linked to group rights.326 Instead, ad-
vocacy could be founded on individual rights."7 But, under
such a justification of group libel, the right of an individual to
be judged free of group associations would be possible only by
curtailing another individual's ability to speak freely. Thus, the
increased popularity of freedom of expression in the 1930s"~
made it impossible to rely on the individualistic conception of
group libel. Therefore, by the end of World War II, neither the
individualistic nor the group rights conception of group libel
laws seemed acceptable.
The law review articles that tried to defend group libel
statutes quickly found themselves caught in the conundrum of
reconciling group libel statutes with America's individualism
and preference for freedom of expression. One of the defenses
proffered tried to skirt the problem by the now-familiar method
of linking group libel to breach of the peace. 2 9 Another de-
fense tried to limit group libel laws to material circulated
" See supra Parts III, VI.
.2 See supra Introduction, Part III.
" See supra Introduction, Part III.
3 See supra notes 277-279 and accompanying text.
' See Freedom of Speech, supra note 311, at 224-25.
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through the federal mails, arguing that because Congress
might regulate materials carried in the mails, it should be free
to use that power to filter out defamatory material."' These
two approaches faced the severe limitation that the bulk of
instances of group libel did not cause an immediate breach of
the peace and/or did not circulate through the mails.
The defense that attacked the legal obstacles to group libel
most directly was a model group libel statute published in a
1947 Columbia Law Review article, Statutory Prohibition of
Group Defamation.3"' However, that defense was also lack-
ing. Specifically, the model statute had three flaws: it allowed
truth as a defense to libel (though it eliminated reasonable
belief in the truth of the statement as a defense), it required
the plaintiff or prosecutor to post a bond with the court to
cover court costs if the defendant prevailed, and it provided
only a retraction of the defamatory statement and an injunc-
tion on future defamatory statements as a remedy.332 There-
fore, even a remote chance that the defendant might prove the
objective truth of his statement might be enough to deter pros-
ecutions, since such an outcome might lend increased legitima-
cy to the statement. Moreover, the proposed sanction was rela-
tively minor.
Thus, those articles purported to manipulate legal techni-
calities to reconcile group libel statutes with freedom of expres-
sion. But they ignored the underlying problems with group
libel laws: any such statute could only be justified by relying
on the group rights based conception of democracy, which was
inconceivable to most Americans by the end of World War II,
or, alternately, by relying on an individual rights based concep-
tion, which violated the right to free expression that was wide-
ly viewed as an almost sacred right. Because those articles'
suggestions for group libel statutes avoided such vexing prob-
lems, it is not surprising that they were so weakly worded.
Aside from such flimsy defenses of group libel statutes, the
only other option for how to deal with group libel available to
American Jewish groups was to fully abandon efforts to prohib-
it group libel. This is largely what occured at a 1949 sympo-
"o See Perlman & Ploscowe, supra note 311, at 20-23.
31 See generally Statutory Prohibition, supra note 6.
See Statutory Prohibition, supra note 6, at 608-12.
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sium of Jewish groups. While the AJC decided to oppose group
libel laws as early as 1935, other Jewish organizations took
longer to develop a set policy about the topic. At the sympo-
sium, four major Jewish defense organizations expressed their
views about group libel in response to a bill offered in Con-
gress that would ban defamatory material from the mails and
from interstate commerce.333
The American Jewish Congress supported the bill, while
the AJC, the ADL, and the Jewish Labor Committee opposed
the billy.14 The American Jewish Congress drafted the bill 3
s5
and included defenses of truth of the statement, reasonable
belief in the truth of the statement, or the absence of an intent
to create ill will.3 36 In support of the bill, the American Jew-
ish Congress argued that the Supreme Court had the power to
punish libel and that these defenses guarded the bill against
charges that it infringed upon freedom of speech. 7 It also
argued that such a law was necessary because "racial defama-
tion cannot be overcome merely by counter-propaganda."338
Finally, it argued that lax enforcement of defamation and the
publicity given to group defamers at their trials should not
impede efforts to ban group libel.339
However, the AJC saw the law as severely limited because
it would only affect group libel that passed through the
mails. 4 ° But the AJC also opposed statutes with wider juris-
diction because of the role juries would play in the trial.34 1 It
feared that juries would acquit group libelers because Jews
would be excluded from sitting on juries in group libel cases,
because jurors would be sympathetic to free expression, and
because jurors might harbor latent anti-Semitic feelings. 34 It
See Symposium, supra note 296, at 1.
' See generally Symposium, supra note 296.
The American Jewish Congress also wrote model group libel bills for states
and municipalities. See, e.g., CLSA REPORTS, MODEL STATE GROUP LmEL (Mar. 2,
1949); CLSA REPORTS, MODEL RACE HATRED ORDINANCE FOR MUNICIPALITIES (Nov.
26, 1947); CLSA REPORTS, PROPOSED REVISION OF INDIANA HATE BILL (Jan. 31,
1947) (all on file with the American Jewish Congress archives).
See Symposium, supra note 296, at 1-2.
See Symposium, supra note 296, at 2.
Symposium, supra note 296, at 3.
' See Symposium, supra note 296, at 1-3.
34o See Symposium, supra note 296, at 4.
3" See Symposium, supra note 296, at 4.
.42 See Symposium, supra note 296, at 4.
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also noted obstacles inherent in bringing even individual libel
suits. Therefore, rather than support group libel statutes, the
AJC recommended treating anti-Semitic outbursts with si-
lence.343
The ADL expressed similar sentiments. However, it also
feared "boomerang effects," whereby such laws might be used
to censor the very groups they were designed to protect.3"
The ADL stated that it was unclear if "an effective statute can
be drawn which copes with the evil of group libel without, at
the same time, so threatening freedom of bona fide discussion
of public questions as to react to the prejudice of the very mi-
nority groups which the statute is supposedly designed to pro-
tect."
345
Also, the ADL noted that some group libel statutes, espe-
cially those making truth a defense to the libel charge, would
actually cause further harm to the Jews by "turn[ing] the
courtroom into a forum for discussion of such issues as wheth-
er or not Jews are evil."346 Furthermore, the ADL noted that
any group libel statute would necessarily "constitute a threat
to legitimate discussion of public questions," and that efforts
would be better spent combating anti-Semitism privately.' 7
Moreover, the ADL was discouraged by the constitutional bar-
riers that such statutes encountered. 34' Nonetheless, by 1949
anti-Semitism was at a "low ebb" in America. 49 Thus, in
such a context, group libel statutes would cause more harm
than good by impeding free expression.350
Significantly, even the American Jewish Congress, while
defending the bill, still conceded the importance of freedom of
expression. It stated that "[olur society holds dear the free
market in ideas." 5' This recognition, if not acceptance, of
First Amendment values also led the American Jewish Con-
gress to oppose other federal group laws that were too restric-
" See Symposium, supra note 296, at 3-5.
14 See Symposium, supra note 296, at 6.
" Symposium, supra note 296, at 5.
3" Symposium, supra note 296, at 6.
3 Symposium, supra note 296, at 5.
'" See Symposium, supra note 296, at 5-6.
3" See Symposium, supra note 296, at 5-6.
350 See Symposium, supra note 296, at 5-6.
351 Symposium, supra note 296, at 2.
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five of freedom of speech." 2 The obstacles that freedom of ex-
pression created for group libel statutes were perhaps best
summarized by the Jewish Labor Committee at the sympo-
sium. It stated:
For many years those active in the fight for civil liberties have
sought in vain to draft legislation which would punish racial bigots,
without at the same time opening the door for widespread attacks
upon justifiable comment and upon civil liberties. The dilemma
which has been caused is well illustrated by the proposed Federal
bill drafted by the American Jewish Congress. In its anxiety to safe-
guard civil liberties, it is full of so many qualifications and limita-
tions that, in our judgement, it cannot bring about the punishment
of those who with professional skill spread racial prejudice and ra-
cial hatred. Yet, in all probability, fewer limitations could not be
drafted without leaving a threat to civil liberties.353
The symposium is significant because it seemed to signal
the end of group libel as a concern for American Jews, and for
Americans generally. By 1949, the year of the symposium, the
ascendence of individualism in American society coupled with
the increasing importance of freedom of expression made de-
fending group libel laws virtually impossible. Riesman noted
that the "American heritage of middle-class individualistic
liberalism"3" stood in the way of such laws. While American
Jews were extremely middle class and individualistic even by
the time that Riesman wrote his article in 1942, those tenden-
cies only increased as America moved on into the 1950s. 5'
They had no reason to re-evaluate the American creed that
had advanced them so far.
The response of American Jews to World War II illustrates
how far American Jews had come in internalizing the primacy
of individual rights.35 Indeed, Riesman stated that the great-
est threat to American democracy did "not spring from the
'state,' but from 'private' fascist groups."357 However, to Amer-
ican Jews in the 1950s, this type of statement must have
... See Symposium, supra note 296, at 7; Phil Baum, Good-And Bad-Group
Libel Bills, 16 CONGRESS WEEKLY 9 (1949) (on file with the American Jewish
Congress archives).
3 Symposium, supra note 296, at 7.
Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 734.
See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 646-57.
See DINNERSTEIN, ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 158, at 150-74.
... Riesman, Group Libel, supra note 2, at 779.
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seemed wrong. Not only did anti-Semitism and fascism in
America decline dramatically after World War II, but the rise
of the Cold War and McCarthyism also made the state seem
like a very real threat to democracy. Jews were wary of Red-
baiting and government witch hunts, with their possibly anti-
Semitic overtones, especially in the aftermath of the Rosenberg
espionage trials."8 The AJC stated in its 1951 annual report
that one Cold War bill, "if enacted into law.., could be used
to prosecute unjustly liberals and liberal organizations and
could thus deal a great and unnecessary blow to freedom of
speech."359 Even sections of the federal government were
wary of the growing suspicion of Communists in America. The
United States President's Committee on Civil Rights, in its
1947 report to President Truman entitled, To Secure These
Rights,"' noted that "public excitement about Communism
has gone far beyond the dictates of... good judgement' and
'calmness.' A state of near hysteria now threatens to inhibit
the freedoms of genuine democrats."36 Significantly, the re-
port also opposed the enactment of group libel statutes, claim-
ing, "Our purpose is not to constrict anyone's freedom to speak;
it is rather to enable the people better to judge the true mo-
tives of those who try to sway them."36' Thus, it seemed that
the group libel debate had concluded, with the opponents of
the statutes having won. However, the debate was not quite
over, as is discussed next.
VII. BEAUHARNAIS V. ILLINOIS
In 1952, the Supreme Court decided Beauharnais v. Illi-
nois,363 a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Frankfurter that up-
held the constitutionality of an Illinois group libel statute. This
... See SACHAR, supra note 83, at 623-41.
319 THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL
MEETING 37 (1951) (on file with the American Jewish Committee archives).
360 UNITED STATES PRESIDEN'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE
RIGHTS 49 (1947).
36 Id.
36 Id. at 51-53. Instead of advocating group libel statutes, the report suggested
laws that required the identity of disseminators of any material to be widely dis-
tributed. See id.
3 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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was the first time that the Supreme Court-or at least the
modern Court-had addressed group libel statutes.
The decision was a surprise for many reasons, particularly
because it was decided against a backdrop of Supreme Court
decisions that had seemed increasingly sympathetic to freedom
of expression. For instance, in 1925 the Court invalidated a
group libel statute on freedom of expression grounds in Gitlow
v. New York," and it reaffirmed its objections to prior re-
straints in 1931 in Near v. Minnesota."' Moreover, in 1937,
the Court expanded First Ammendment protection to unpopu-
lar political speech,366 and in 1939 barred over-inclusive state
regulation of leafleting in public places.367 By comparison, the
Court was less consistent in upholding freedom of expression
in cases that might be read to implicate group libel more di-
rectly.3 6
8
For example, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,3 6 the Court
ruled that a Jehovah's Witness who attacked Catholicism by
playing a record on a public street could not be punished for
tending to commit a breach of the peace under the common
law.37 However, the Court left open two possibilities for reg-
ulating such speech: if a state passed a statute narrowly drawn
to address conduct that would have a tendency to create a
breach of the peace, or if an actual breach of the peace, defined
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
's 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
' See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242 (1937).
, See Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
Many of the Court's First Amendment decisions were decided after 1938, the
year United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), was decided, with
its seminal footnote number four. Yet the theories contained in the footnote do not
seem to offer a clear answer to the problem of group libel. Indeed, two of the
footnote's dictates appear to clash on the issue of group libel. The first paragraph
of the footnote claims that courts should step up judicial scrutiny "when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments." Id. at 152. This would seem to mandate spe-
cial protection for freedom of expression. But the third paragraph of the footnote
states that similar increased scrutiny may be necessary to protect "discrete and
insular minorities." Id. at 153. Drawn out to its logical conclusion, the third para-
graph thus suggests that protecting defamed groups may be paramount. In any
case, the Supreme Court did not directly address the footnote, or its potential
contradictions, in its treatment of group libel cases.
'6' 310 U.S. 296 (1939).
370 See id. at 300-01, 309-10.
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not only as violent acts but also as "words likely to produce
violence in others,"371 had actually occurred. Thus, while the
case was decided on the basis of free exercise of religion, it also
had direct implications for freedom of expression.
However, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,372 the Court
was less sympathetic towards a person who called a police
officer a "God-damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist." The
Court unanimously sustained the defendant's conviction, stat-
ing that restricting fighting words, the lewd, the obscene, the
profane, and the libelous has "never been thought to raise any
constitutional problems."73
The Court seemed to back off of such a restrictive interpre-
tation of speech in Terminiello v. Chicago. 4 There, the Court
reversed the conviction of Arthur Terminiello3 71 who was ar-
rested for breach of the peace, following a speech he made in
which he "criticized various political and racial groups whose
activities he denounced as inimical to the nation's welfare."76
The majority opinion by Justice Douglas recognized that
speech may have "unsettling effects."377 Nonetheless, he not-
ed that speech is "protected against censorship or punishment,
unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconve-
nience, annoyance, or unrest."378 But, the Terminiello case
did not decide the issue of whether Terminiello's speech actual-
ly provoked such a clear and present danger; instead, the
Court held in favor of the defendant because a jury instruction
gave too broad a definition of what constituted a breach of the
peace.379
These cases convinced commentators that the Court would
grant great deference to the First Amendment at the expense
of libel and group libel laws. Commentators believed this be-
cause, while Chaplinsky and Cantwell at least theoretically
311 Id. at 307-08.
372 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
313 Id. at 571-72.
:7' 337 U.S. 1 (1948).
... See id. at 5.
316 Id. at 3.
37 Id. at 2.
378 Id. at 3, 4.
3"9 See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4-5.
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removed libel laws from the reach of the First Amendment,
Terminiello showed that the Court, in practice, would look
disfavorably on restrictions of a wide variety of speech. As was
noted in the Introduction to this Article, one commentator
decried that "in the eyes of the law the Jews do not exist as a
group .... [Tihere is no effective remedy against their defama-
tion as a group.""' Similarly, the American Jewish Congress
issued a memo in response to the Terminiello decision that
illustrates how the organization interpreted the Supreme
Court's evolving jurisprudence. The memo stated that "[tihe
significance of the opinion, it is submitted, lies in the fact that
the majority went to such unprecedented lengths to avoid af-
firming Terminiello's conviction." 8 ' The AJC expressed simi-
lar predictions about the fate of group libel laws. In 1949 it
noted that "[tihe trend of American jurisprudence has been to
restrict the law of criminal libel rather than to extend it." 82
Indeed, after the Illinois Supreme Court sustained the
conviction of the defendant in the Beauharnais case,3" the
AJC and the ADL lamented:
The decision... in this case adds another confused facet to the
already confusing group of decisions involving the limits of freedom
of speech and press recently handed down by the highest courts of
the land. It is difficult to see how this can be distinguished on its
facts from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
Terminiello case.3u
Considering the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and the pre-
vailing view amongst those interested in group libel laws that
the laws were on increasingly shaky constitutional footing, the
Court's affirmance of Beauharnais's conviction was quite unex-
pected. The reasoning of both Justice Frankfurter's majority
opinion and of the dissents shows that the central themes of
" Konvitz, supra note 1, at 188.381 Will Maslow, CLSA REPORTS 4 (May 19, 1949) (on file with the American
Jewish Congress archives).
3'2 MEMORANDUM ON GROUP LIBEL (1949) (on file with the American Jewish
Committee archives, Civil Rights Department: Joint memoranda and other mailings
1950-52).
3" See People v. Beauharnais, 97 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. 1951).
JOINT MEMORANDUM: THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE AND THE ANTI-DEF-
AMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH 2 (Mar. 21, 1951) (on file with the American
Jewish Committee Archives, Civil Rights Department, Joint memoranda and other
mailings, 1950-52).
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this Article, namely, (1) the link between group libel and group
rights and (2) the tension between having a strong First
Amendment and strong group libel laws, were on the minds of
the justices as they addressed the issue of group libel for the
first time.
In the case, the defendant, Beauharnais, was fined $200
for distributing a petition urging the mayor of Chicago to stop
the encroachment of blacks into white neighborhoods.3" The
petition specifically claimed, "If persuasion and the need to
prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the ne-
gro will not unite us, then the aggressions .. rapes, robberies,
knives, guns, and marijuana of the negro surely will."3
Beauharnais was charged under a statute dating back to
1917, which provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufac-
ture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in
any public place in this state any lithograph, moving picture, play,
drama or sketch, which publication or exhibition portrays depravity,
criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any
race, color, creed, or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or
which is productive of breach of the peace or riots .... "
It is first important to note certain characteristics about
the law itself. As the Beauharnais opinion illustrates, the law
was passed during a lull between race riots in St. Louis.388
While it is unclear if this specific bill was a result of direct
lobbying by the ADL, it certainly bears the marks of the ADL's
stance towards group libel. That is, the law's emphasis on
defamation in movies and theaters echoes back to the ADL's
concern in the late 1910s with anti-Semitic depictions of Jews
in such venues.389 Indeed, the ADL highlights that a model
bill, which it drafted to combat discriminatory hotel advertise-
ments, was adopted in Illinois in 1917."9 Regardless of
whether or not the law resulted directly from the ADL's ef-
forts, it surely resembles bills for which the ADL lobbied, and
3" See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251.
M Id. at 252.
"3 ILL. REV. STAT. 1949, ch. 38, § 471; see also Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 259.
See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 259-61.
' See supra Part III.
"3 See B'NAI B'RITH MANUAL, supra note 129, at 360-67.
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it evidences the link between the Beauharnais case and the
ADL's first attempts to prohibit group libel.
Frankfurter's opinion in Beauharnais39' first noted that
the Illinois group libel statute is essentially a variant of a
criminal libel law; moreover, the statute essentially "para-
phrases the traditional justification for punishing libels crimi-
nally, namely, their 'tendency to cause breach of the
peace.'"392 Thus, Frankfurter clarified that group libel, by its
historical link to criminal libel, has a well-established justifica-
tion-preserving the peace. However, in a footnote, Frankfurt-
er stated that with group libel statutes, the "gravamen of the
offense" is also injury to reputation of the defamed group.393
Then, Frankfurter cited to Cantwell and Chaplinsky for the
proposition that certain narrow categories of words, "the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous and the insulting or
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"
deserve no First Amendment protection.394 Frankfurter con-
cluded this part of the opinion by completing the syllogism he
had drawn up: (1) group libel is a form of libel; (2) libel is not
protected by the First Amendment; (3) therefore, group libel is
not protected by the First Amendment.
Frankfurter then analyzed the history that had prompted
Illinois to pass the statute. He stated that Illinois had a histo-
ry of racial strife, and that the statute was passed in a lull
between two race riots in St. Louis, and two years prior to a
week-long race riot in Chicago. Moreover, he recognized that,
given the recurrent problem of racial strife, even if the specific
group libel legislation at issue "will not help matters" it would
be "out of bounds for the judiciary to deny the legislature a
choice of policy, provided it is not unrelated to the problem and
not forbidden by some explicit limitation on the State's pow-
er. '395 Essentially, in modem constitutional parlance, Frank-
... Frankfurter was joined by Chief Justice Vinson, and Justices Burton, Clark,
and Minton. Separate dissents, discussed in more depth later in this Part, were
written by Justices Black, Douglas, Reed, and Jackson.
" Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 254 (quoting People v. Speilman, 149 N.E. 466,
469 (Ill. 1925)).
3'3 Id. at 254 n.3.
-' Id. at 256-57.
3' Id. at 262.
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furter reasoned that there was a rational basis between the
problem, racial strife and breach of the peace, and the state's
remedy, passage of a statute permitting prosecution of group
libel. Nothing more was required in light of Frankfurter's con-
clusion that the First Amendment did not protect group libel,
and therefore, there was "explicit limitation on the state's
power " "' posed by the Constitution in this instance.
If Frankfurter's opinion had ended there, the Beauharnais
holding, but not its reasoning, still would have been surprising.
The case would merely represent a straightforward, if some-
what literal, application of the theories that the Court had
previously established in Cantwell and Chaplinsky, which
exempted certain types of speech, including libel, from First
Amendment protections. Frankfurter's finding of a sufficient
rational basis between race riots and group libel laws, again,
was not so surprising.
However, the opinion continued, and it indicates that more
than the power of a logical syllogism led Frankfurter to write
the decision as he did. Although the following language is
included in the part of the opinion that discussed the state
legislature's possible rationales for passing the statute, it dem-
onstrates that Frankfurter was aware of, and arguably approv-
ing of, the various justifications for group libel that have been
discussed in this Article.
Frankfurter discussed the rights of the individual, stating
that "[sluch group-protection on behalf of the individual may,
for all we know, be a need not confined to the part that a trade
union plays in effectuating rights abstractly recognized as
belonging to its members."397 This, of course, resonates of the
individual-based justification for group libel statutes, namely,
that group libel violates the integrity of the individual by at-
tributing to him the characteristics of his group, regardless of
his own characteristics. This conception of group libel statutes
seemed viable enough when viewed in isolation, but it became
vulnerable in the face of an increasingly robust First Amend-
ment, which created a tension between individual rights-the
right to speak versus the right to be treated as an individual.
Frankfurter was free to use the individual rights basis for
396 Id.
" Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 263.
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group libel statutes because he eliminated the tension by elimi-
nating the First Amendment issue. That is, by holding that
group libel was outside the bounds of First Amendment protec-
tion, Frankfurter was free to rely on the individual rights justi-
fication.
However, Frankfurter did not rely solely on the individual
rights justification of group libel statutes. Rather, he was also
aware of the group rights justification of group libel statutes,
and he relied to some degree on that justification. For example,
he stated:
It is not within our competence to confirm or deny claims of social
scientists as to the dependence of the individual on the position of
his racial or religious group in the community. It would, however, be
arrant dogmatism, quite outside the scope of our authority in pass-
ing on the powers of a State, for us to deny that.., a man's job and
his educational opportunities and the dignity accorded him may
depend as much on the reputation of the racial and religious group
to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own merits."'
This language does not wholly abandon the rights of indi-
viduals. Significantly, however, the language also notes how
the reputation of the individual may be inextricably inter-
twined with the reputation of the group. The Beauharnais
opinion brings to the foreground the special justification of
group libel statutes that Frankfurter had acknowledged previ-
ously in the opinion, that such statutes protect the reputation
of the group itself. Additionally, by explicitly relying on that
justification, the opinion's reasoning hearkens back to the
reasoning used by Riesman to justify group libel statutes, and,
through Riesman, to Kallen's group-based conception of democ-
racy. Indeed, Frankfurter cited Riesman's group libel article in
the opinion, 99 and Frankfurter's reference, in the above pas-
sage, to "claims of social scientists," is essentially a nod to
Riesman.0 ° It is true, of course, that Riesman's theories con-
stitute just one of the threads that Frankfurter wove into the
... Id. at 262-63.
"' See id. at 261 n.16.
'0 It is striking to note that this explicit reference by Frankfurter to "claims of
social scientists" predates by almost two years the Supreme Court's famous state-
ment in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11 (1954), that the
works of Kenneth Clark and other psychologists buttressed its holding in that
case.
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Beauharnais opinion. However, this neither lessens the signifi-
cance of the Supreme Court's recognition that group libel laws
are intricately related to group rights, nor diminishes the offi-
cial protection of those groups by the state that the case
grants.4
01
Nonetheless, in his conclusion, Frankfurter reverted to
more traditional legal grounds: holding that the law contained
sufficient procedural safeguards, especially regarding the truth
as a defense; that the law was not overly vague; and that the
clear and present danger test had no bearing on this case be-
cause group libel was not protected by the First Amendment.
The very end of the opinion, however, contains a slight sur-
prise, considering the firm defense of group libel statutes con-
tained in the body of the opinion. The Beauharnais case pro-
hibited only written group defamations. In a footnote to the
opinion, Frankfurter distinguished this case from New Jersey
v. Klapprott,"' in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that a statute prohibiting spoken group libel violated the First
Amendment. The implication seems to be that group defama-
tion, whatever its ill effects on individuals and groups, cannot
be regulated if it is spoken, rather than written. This distinc-
tion serves as a reminder of the boundaries that the Supreme
Court would not cross to combat group libel, even if it could
see virtues in the statutes.
Aside from Frankfurter's majority opinion, two of the four
dissents deserve special mention.4"3 The first is Justice
401 Frankfurter's concern for groups as groups also evidenced itself during the
conference where the justices discussed the Beauharnais case. According to Justice
Douglas' notes, Frankfurter stated, "[Tihis statute extends [the] law of libel to a
group to protect its rights against those who would like to liquidate the group."
Notes of Justice Douglas, Dec. 1, 1951 (on file with the United States Library of
Congress, Papers of William 0. Douglas (in file entitled "No.11(d)-Beauharnais
v. Illinois O.T. 51 Conference, Certiorari & Misc. Memos")). Given his chilling use
of the word "liquidate," it seems that Frankfurter, like Riesman in the articles
Frankfurt relied on, was concerned not only with groups in general but also with
the fate of the European Jews during World War II specifically. Apparently, Jus-
tice Jackson, who served as prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials and whose
Beauharnais dissent supported group libel statutes in theory, also was thinking of
the Holocaust. He wrote, "Group libel statutes represent a commendable desire to
reduce sinister abuses of our freedoms of expression-abuses which I have had
occasion to learn can tear apart a society, brutalize its dominant elements, and
persecute, even to extermination, its minorities." Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 304
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
40 22 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1941).
4' The other two dissents are of less interest for the purposes of this Article.
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Black's dissent, joined by Justice Douglas, which focused on
what Black viewed as a violation of Beauharnais' First Amend-
ment rights, not just of freedom of speech, but of his right to
petition the government. °' Thus, Black, in contrast to Frank-
furter, recognized a direct conflict between group libel laws
and First Amendment protections. Specifically, Black wrote,
"Every expansion of the law of criminal libel so as to punish
discussions of matters of public concern means a corresponding
invasion of the area dedicated to free expression by the First
Amendment."'
Even more significantly, in his own dissent, Justice Doug-
las showed similar concern with the tension between libel laws
and First Amendment values. He criticized the majority opin-
ion because, in his view, it "represents a philosophy at war
with the First Amendment-a consitutional interpretation
which puts free speech under the legislative thumb." 6 Yet
Douglas seemed to worry about more than just upholding free-
speech values to protect the integrity of the First Amend-
ment-Douglas seemed specifically concerned with the fate of
minorities under a regime of limited free speech. Indeed, he
wrote, "Today a white man stands convicted for protesting in
unseemly language against our decisions invalidating restric-
tive covenants. Tomorrow a Negro will be hailed before a court
for denouncing lynch law... ..o 7 Douglas concluded his dis-
sent by stating that the majority decision "is a warning to
every minority that when the Consitution guarantees free
speech it does not mean what it says."
Justice Reed, joined by Justice Douglas, objected to the majority decision on the
grounds that the language of the statute was too vague. See Beauharnais, 343
U.S. at 281-83. Finally, Justice Jackson's dissent noted that he had no theoretical
objection to group libel laws, but that, in the case at hand, insufficient procedural
protections were provided to Beauharnais. See id. at 303-05. Interestingly, Justice
Jackson, while not opposed to criminal libel laws, noted that with regard to group
libel statutes, "No group interest in any particular prosecution should forget that
the shoe may be on the other foot in some prosecution tomorrow." Id. at 304.
Thus, like Douglas, Jackson was aware of the potentially adverse effect group libel
laws could have on minorities.
'4 See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 267.
"05 Id. at 272 (Black, J., dissenting).
o Id. at 287 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"0 Id. at 286.
408 Id. at 287. One of Justice Douglas' law clerks stated the point in similar
terms in a memo that he wrote to the Justice prior to the motion for rehearing in
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The difference between Douglas' and Frankfurter's ap-
proaches could not be more stark. Their opinions make clear
that both were concerned about the treatment of minorities.
Yet Frankfurter, like Riesman, focused on the importance of
protecting the group itself from slander, while Douglas, like
much of the American Jewish community, focused on the bene-
fits of free speech that accrued to individual members of mi-
nority groups. Ultimately, Frankfurter won the day.4"9
However, despite the surprise surrounding the outcome of
the Beauharnais case, and the reasoning that Frankfurter
invoked in justifying the group libel statutes, the decision did
not spark a renaissance of group libel statutes. In fact, the
Illinois legislature struck its group libel statute from the books
in 1961.410 By partly grounding his theory in group rights,
Frankfurter made use of a theory that Americans had never
accepted in large numbers. Indeed, Frankfurter's acknowledg-
ment of the legitimacy of group rights stands in stark contrast
to the statement made by President Wilson, decades earlier,
that assimilation was a requirement for American citizens.
And by the 1950s, American Jews, who had been the strongest
advocates of group libel laws, had long since decided to pursue
an individualistic conception of life in America. Thus, when the
Supreme Court in 1952 finally articulated a defense of group
the Beauharnais case. The clerk wrote:
This type of group libel statute could be used to suppress any unfavor-
able comment about any identifiable group .... History teaches that in
the past libel laws have been used to curb unfavorable public comment.
By recognizing the power to regulate, the Court has sown the seeds of a
dangerous concept.
Memo for MLS to Justice Douglas, May 28, 1952 (on file with the United States
Library of Congress, Papers of William 0. Douglas, Box No. 217 (in file entitled
"No.118(d)-Beauharnais v. Illinois O.T. 51 Conference, Certiorari & Misc. Mem-
os")).
,o9 But Frankfurter barely won it. According to Justice Douglas' notes, Justice
Clark, who joined the majority in upholding the constitutionality of the Illinois
statute, later decided that the statute was in fact unconstitutional. Douglas wrote
in his notes, "Clark now thinks the staute is unconstitutional but votes to deny
petition for rehearing." Justice Douglas' Docket and Voting Sheet for Beauharnais,
Case No. 118 (on file with the United States Library of Congress, Papers of Wil-
liam 0. Douglas, Box. No. 209 (in file entitled "OT 1951 Administrative Docket
Book # 1-300")). Had Clark changed his mind sooner, Frankfurter's opinion would
have been a minority opinion.
... KALVEN, supra note 3, at 7.
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libel statutes partly based on group rights, whatever popular
support for the idea that might have existed earlier had long
since evaporated.411
Moreover, to the extent that the Beauharnais majority
relied on individual rights, that justification of group libel
statutes was quickly closed off by the still vigorous First
Amendment. The Supreme Court's view towards the First
Amendment is perhaps best shown by its decision in New York
Times v. Sullivan.412 There, the Supreme Court reversed a
jury's libel award of $500,000 on the basis that the award
violated the First Amendment.413 In holding that the award
could not stand, the Court had to refute claims that libel was
exempt from First Amendment protections. The Supreme
Court held that it would violate the First Amendment for "a
good-faith critic of government [to] be penalized for his criti-
cism."4 ' Consequently, although the Court left theoretically
intact the exemption of libel from First Amendment
protections, it showed that, in practice, the First Amendment
would be treated deferentially. 45 Essentially, then, after the
.1 It is significant to note that Thurgood Marshall, then the head of the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, signed onto a brief in the
Beauharnais case that asked the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision. See
Petition for Rehearing, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 350 (1952). Thus, the
period's foremost legal representative of black Americans, who were both the tar-
get of the defamation in the case and a target of group libel generally, opposed
group libel laws by the 1950s. Earlier in the century, however, the NAACP was
more sympathetic to group libel legislation, especially in response to the racist
portrayals in D.W. Griffith's film, BIRTH OF A NATION. See ROBERT L. ZANGRADO,
THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909.1950, 33-34 (1980).
412 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
413 See id. at 292. For a full treatment of the history of the Neu York Times v.
Sullivan case, see generally ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991).
4" Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292. In Sullivan, the Court specifically noted that its
holding did not contradict Beauharnais. As the Sullivan Court stated:
In Beauharnais v. Illinois, the Court sustained an Illinois criminal libel
statute as applied to a publication held to be both defamatory of a racial
group and "liable to cause violence and disorder." But the Court was
careful to note that it "retains and exercises authority to nullify action
which encroaches on freedom of utterance under the guise of punishing
libel," for "public men, are, as it were, public property," and "discussion
cannot be denied and the right, as well as the duty, of criticism must
not be stifled."
376 U.S. at 268 (citations omitted).
"' For an elaboration of the theory that Sullivan had an adverse impact on the
potential of Beauharnais, see FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court's belated approval of group libel statutes in
Beauharnais, the issue disappeared from view, until more re-
cent times.
CONCLUSION
Given the current debate regarding hate speech and its
regulation, it seems vital to remember that America has been
down this road before. The discussions that exist about
America's early group libel and hate speech laws have exam-
ined relatively narrow legal aspects of the issue. This Article
has tried to show that attempts to decipher these early group
libel laws can only take place after one understands the back-
ground social history. That background history indicates that
group libel laws might be better understood as a manifestation
of a group rights oriented conception of American society. This
is illustrated by the shifting views held by American Jews
towards the issue, whose attitudes towards the issue of group
rights parallel their attitudes towards group libel statutes.
The background history discussed in this Article can be
briefly summarized. Debates during the early 1900s about how
immigrants should acculturate to life in America influenced
whether group libel laws were viewed as desirable or not.
American Jews, who showed a keen interest -in the issue of
group libel throughout, initially vacillated between pursuing
individualistic and group-based conceptions of life in America.
At first, both conceptions could support group libel statutes,
and the laws achieved some success.
However, after the 1920s, several factors mitigated the
continued support for such laws. First, the Dearborn Indepen-
dent incident with Henry Ford showed that the courts would
look upon group libel laws unfavorably, however strongly
American Jews advocated them. Second, and more important
for the purposes of this Article, Jews began to embrace an
individualistic conception of life in America as they started to
succeed economically and socially in America. As World War II
approached, American Jews clung even more fiercely to indi-
vidual rights as a means to prove their patriotism. The rise of
SOCIETY 90-95 (1981); WALKER, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 118-20; KALVEN,
supra note 3, at 52-64.
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individualism amongst American Jews eliminated the defense
of group libel laws based on group rights. Third, as Americans
in general, and Jews in particular, began to place increased
value in an individual's right to freedom of expression, a de-
fense of group libel laws based on individual rights became
untenable. Thus, by the time the anti-Semitism of World War
II started to manifest itself, American Jews generally opposed
group libel statutes. When the Supreme Court finally decided
Beauharnais, with its reliance on group rights and a relatively
restrained view of freedom of expression, support for the stat-
utes had evaporated, and the case had little effect.
The group libel debate obviously did not end in the 1950s.
The controversy in Skokie, Illinois in the 1970s, in which
American Nazis attempted to march through a heavily Jewish
suburb of Chicago, is perhaps the best known episode that re-
newed interest in the issue. More recent examples include
support for university speech codes, the Supreme Court's
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul decision,416 and, more generally, the
increased awareness of the role speech plays in an increasingly
multicultural society. The issue has become one of resurgent
importance, and increased debate, in American society. There
are obvious parallels that can be drawn between the historical
debates regarding group libel laws and the contemporary de-
bate. This Article's central point has been that America's his-
torical experiences indicate that group libel laws seem best
suited to a conception of society that views group rights gener-
ally in favorable terms. If this point drawn from America's past
experiences informs today's debate on whether such laws are
beneficial, the participants will hopefully be better equipped to
continue the discussion.
46 505 U.S. 377 (1992).

